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Abstract 
 
In the bitter sectarian conflict of the Northern Ireland Troubles, which spanned the years 1966-
1998, culpability has usually been firmly placed in the actions of the Irish Republican Army, a 
group seeking reunification with the Republic of Ireland. This thesis argues that the roles of 
Protestant loyalist paramilitaries and state forces such as the British Army and Royal Ulster 
Constabulary were equally as important. That this importance is not demonstrated in dominant 
literature remains to be to the detriment of efforts towards reconciliation and the acceptance of 
shared responsibility, and perpetuates the sectarian divide between Protestant and Catholic 
communities. 
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Introduction 
 
Throughout the Northern Ireland Troubles, and especially in recent historical scholarship on the 
events of the conflict, primary culpability and the majority of focus has been given to the actions 
of republican groups and in particular the Irish Republican Army (in Gaelic Óglaigh na 
hÉireann). In popular memory and collective understanding outside of Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland this group exists as a singular entity, responsible for some of Western 
Europe’s most bloody, destructive and expensive acts of sectarian terrorism. This image is 
foremost because it is compatible with the positioning of Britain as guiltless; as the hegemonic 
power involved, it is unsurprising that the dominant narrative casts Britain as the primary victim 
of republican terrorism. In 1977 a British Gallup poll showed that 97% of respondents viewed 
the IRA as terrorists instead of freedom fighters, a statistic that demonstrates how negatively and 
one-dimensionally the group was portrayed outside of Ireland.
1
 This view exists also because 
many IRA actions occurred outside of the island of Ireland and caused more casualties of other 
nationalities than did other paramilitary groups.
2
 This is, however, a simplistic and dangerous 
view of a conflict that was driven largely by entrenched historical motivators and a range of 
long-existent actors, each of which can be cast as victims or antagonists. It is this difficulty in 
ascribing identities of culpability and victimhood that perpetuates division and conflict such as 
still exists in Northern Ireland to the present day. Popular memory in Catholic and Protestant 
communities and the paramilitary organisations that purport to support these groups are in 
                                                            
1 Paul Dixon, "'Hearts and Minds'? British Counter-Insurgency Strategy in Northern Ireland," Journal of Strategic 
Studies 32, no. 3 (2009): 463. 
2 “Statistical breakdown of deaths in the ‘Troubles’,” Wesley Johnston, accessed September 2, 2017, 
http://www.wesleyjohnston.com/users/ireland/past/troubles/troubles_stats.html.  
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constant conflict with each other: “victims and perpetrators are self-ascribed and shifting 
categories.”3  
Analysing republican paramilitaries’ patterns of behaviour, in particular their methods of 
undertaking violence, in conjunction with those from loyalist communities and the actions of 
state forces, reveals a great deal about the motivations and rationalisations behind violence. 
When these are understood, it becomes clear that dominant readings of the Troubles are 
simplistic and do not stress the political and historical drivers behind paramilitary violence. 
There are obvious difficulties in forming an analysis that seeks to rationalise actions of terrorist 
organisations, but it is important also to examine why and how these groups have been 
constituted as terrorists and what this means for future processes of reconciliation and 
community integration. Tension that still exists between the state and paramilitary forces – both 
Catholic and Protestant – would be, to an extent, alleviated if official acknowledgement of the 
reasons for their existence was to occur, and if it was accepted that security forces exacerbated 
patterns of conflict. The role of splinter groups in the perpetuation of violence – as evidenced in 
the 1998 Omagh bombing – is also crucial. 
Unionism and its paramilitary counterpart, loyalism, are fascinating concepts to study, 
especially in a context where the ideal they support – the British Union – was already 
institutionalised. The documented phenomenon of the Protestant ‘siege mentality,’ in which 
suspicion over Catholic motives dominates political decision-making, adds depth to the 
psychological issues that shape conservative unionism. Extreme groupings like the UVF’s 
Shankill Butchers gang establish that loyalist paramilitary leaders had little control over their 
members, and illuminate upon the potential outcomes of loyalism’s lack of political clarity and 
                                                            
3 Allen Feldman, "Political Terror and the Technologies of Memory: Excuse, Sacrifice, Commemoration and 
Actuarial Moralities," Radical History Review 85 (2003): 70. 
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direction. This did not at all mean, however, that Protestant paramilitaries were powerless; on the 
contrary, the influence they wielded against the state was oftentimes wholly damaging to 
institutional politics. The Ulster Workers Council Strike in May 1974 is an important example of 
this and rationalises the republican community’s fears that militant unionists and loyalists 
dominated the province. 
Finally, the role of state security forces is an essential element in creating an analysis of 
how and why violence in Northern Ireland heightened to the level that it did. Existing communal 
tensions between the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Catholic community were driven 
largely by the perception that the former was anti-Catholic and by its occasional proclivity to 
violence against civilians. The British Army’s arrival, while initially positive, swiftly became a 
point of contention for the same reasons. Particular events such as the internment raids of August 
1971 and Bloody Sunday in January 1972 assist in explaining the ways in which republican 
paramilitary groups gained widespread popularity; communal suspicion regarding the police and 
Army’s contributions to loyalist paramilitary groups also created deep tension between society 
and state security. Long-suspected anti-nationalist collusion was eventually found to have existed 
to an alarming degree, as various inquiries after the conclusion of the Troubles has established. 
Of particular note is the encyclopaedic Lost Lives: The stories of the men, women and 
children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland troubles, a tome that details every 
Troubles-related death and provides statistical background on this data. This serves as both a 
commemoration project and a means to comprehend, on an deep level, how the dynamics of the 
conflict shifted over time. By analysing the demographics of each victim – which community 
they belonged to, whether or not they were civilian casualties or (para-)military actors, who they 
were killed by and the nature of the death – an incredibly detailed picture of the Troubles is 
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revealed. Patterns that suggest how and why certain events occurred and being able to evaluate 
the psychological reactions of communities are invaluable in determining the rationality of 
consequent violence. Investigating the conflict by using a prosopography of deaths also grounds 
the Troubles in its human cost, a factor that is too little downplayed or unstudied. The image a 
reading of Lost Lives depicts is one in which each separate actor – republican and loyalist 
paramilitaries and state security forces – has an individual role to play in the conflict as a whole. 
By studying each one in turn, and the key events that they were implicated in during the 
Troubles, the nuanced and complex nature of the conflict is revealed to an extent that it is not 
often granted.  
Another key resource is a trilogy of books, The Northern Ireland Question, which is an 
important entry into the literature focusing on unionism and arguing the case for its ongoing 
legitimacy. The essays contained in these volumes present studies of a range of different 
Northern Irish issues directly from the unionist perspective, which often proves to be obviously 
partisan in its analysis. The often hostile or defensive tone of these pieces demonstrate the depth 
of communal disagreement and support the idea that unionism as an ideology is continually 
unwavering in its political analysis, despite whether or not this may be factually correct. It is a 
fascinating examination of many facets of the conflict and lends a great deal of depth to an 
analysis of the Troubles, especially as it is unique in its presentation of the unionist viewpoint. 
No other historiography on the conflict is presented from this particular perspective. 
 
Northern Ireland exists as a state that cannot be conceived of as a ‘nation’ as it lacks the vital 
elements that constitute one as such. Ernest Renan, in his infamous lecture What is a Nation, 
asserted that a nation-state is uniform and cohesive when it contains an identifiable “rich heritage 
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of memories” that are bolstered by “the will to continue to accredit the heritage that one has 
received undivided,” something that is clearly impossible to achieve in a country whose disparate 
communities remain utterly separate.
4
 Memory in Northern Ireland is necessarily fractured, and 
it is this absence of a coherently shared history which makes existing as a peaceful and 
cooperative society remarkably difficult. Indeed, it is examinable that memories which serve to 
reinforce identities of victimhood “can be used as a powerful legitimisation for committing new 
[atrocities],” a phenomenon which exists to a great degree in the province.5 The continuing 
vitality of sectarian marches and public murals bolsters this process of identity formation. 
Another of Renan’s assertions, made in 1882, that “the division of nations between Catholics and 
Protestants no longer exists… it has nearly nothing to do with the reasons that determine the 
limits of various peoples” may at first appear wholly incorrect given the situation in Northern 
Ireland, but does have relevance.
6
 The role of religion in the conflict is strong because it was the 
demarcating factor in the creation of two distinct societal groups, though this does not 
necessarily mean that the conflict was based on religion itself. For a conflict that escalated in the 
late 1960s religious importance is, at first glance, rather puzzling; in most Western democracies 
and the rest of the United Kingdom the role of religion had consistently been lessening, 
especially regarding the denominational differences within Christianity. But, as Bruce correctly 
establishes, the “initial dimensions of conflict in Ireland were laid out in an era when worldviews 
were heavily informed by religion.”7 The fact that this became so key to existing conflict also 
meant that religious affiliation remained higher in Northern Ireland than in Britain as a whole: a 
survey in 1991 demonstrated that, upon asked about their beliefs, 57% of Northern Irish 
                                                            
4 Ernest Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (lecture, Paris, March 11, 1882). 
5 Ziya Meral, “A Duty to Remember? Politics and Morality of Remembering Past Atrocities,” International Political 
Anthropology 5, no. 1 (2012): 38. 
6 Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?”  
7 Steve Bruce, Paisley: Religion and Politics in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 9. 
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respondents selected “I know God exists” compared to 10% of those in Britain.8 Organisations 
founded on religious lines – particularly Protestant groups such as the Orange Order and Ian 
Paisley’s Presbyterian Free Church – were often determinant in propelling religious doctrine; 
many of these became affiliated with paramilitaries during the conflict. Protestantism was key to 
unionists because it was a defining facet of the British Union; Catholicism was key to 
republicans because it was bound to the concept of being Irish. This created a tension 
between national and religious identity as ‘Irishness,’ being equated with Catholicism, 
necessarily prevented sections of the Protestant community from identifying as Irish - even if 
they similarly found difficulty in truly identifying as British.
9
 This tension continues to exist 
today.  
The ways in which certain events shape popular memory and thus affect a region’s 
climate into the future are dependent on a variety of historical factors. The politically hegemonic 
in a given society necessarily will use the legacy of events and prominent figures to propel a 
particular agenda, regardless of whether or not violence continues to exist in that particular 
society; the case for this is especially clear in the Northern Irish context.
10
 The ways in which the 
actors of the Troubles are typically cast – with the IRA firmly positioned as the antagonist – has 
great and lasting implications. The modern Democratic Unionist Party’s insistence on “resisting 
attempts to rewrite the past” but not in “the partial way republicans would wish” points to a 
continuation of conflict over the legitimacy of certain memories.
11
 As another recent example, 
the suggestion by an Irish junior minister that the worst atrocity of the Troubles – the Dublin 
                                                            
8 Ibid, 57-58. 
9 Brian Graham, “Contested images of place among Protestants in Northern Ireland,” Political Geography 17, no. 2 
(1998): 131. 
10 Meral, “A Duty to Remember?” 40. 
11 “Standing Strong for Northern Ireland: The DUP Manifesto for the 2017 Westminster Election,” Democratic 
Unionist Party, May 31, 2017, accessed July 29, 2017, http://www.mydup.com/publications/view/2017-westminster-
manifesto, 17. 
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Monaghan bombings, in which 33 people were killed – was the work of the IRA instead of its 
actual perpetrators, the loyalist UVF, highlights how the focus on certain groups can distort 
current events and deepen community division.
12
 In all cases, “identity that is based on 
remembering is equally based on forgetting.”13 By understanding the ways in which the actions 
of the IRA, loyalist paramilitaries and state forces are commonly remembered, a more nuanced 
and realistic image of the Northern Ireland Troubles will emerge. 
                                                            
12 Ellen Coyne, “Bomb survivors take on ‘clueless’ minister,” The Times, August 29, 2017, accessed August 29, 
2017, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/bomb-survivors-take-on-clueless-minister-vkxht5fkz. 
13 Meral, “A Duty to Remember?” 45. 
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Chapter One 
Republicanism and the IRA 
 
Republicans, in particular the Irish Republican Army, have been made responsible for a great 
deal of the Northern Ireland Troubles. While it is undeniable that the IRA committed horrifically 
damaging crimes and took the lives of many people, civilian and military, their role in the 
conflict is often overstated compared to other non-republican actors. Legitimate civil rights 
grievances and experience of physical provocation by loyalists or state forces prompted the 
hitherto peaceful Catholic community to support paramilitary aims, often for reasons of 
protection; the IRA was able to provide this. Thus the rise of republican groups must be viewed 
in historical and social context. Furthermore, the role of dissident IRA stylings towards the end 
of the Troubles is important to analyse, as they constitute an invalid reading of traditional Irish 
republicanism but their actions cemented the view of the IRA as the conflict’s primary terrorist 
organisation. 
The Irish republican tradition has a long and complicated history, dating back to the late 
12
th
 century when the island was invaded by the Normans. After a period of Gaelic resurgence, a 
decision was made by King Henry VIII to conquer Ireland, bring it under the rule of the British 
crown and eventually to convert its inhabitants to Protestantism. In 1690 a pivotal conflict, the 
Battle of the Boyne, was fought between the deposed Catholic king James II and the Protestant 
William of Orange and eventuated in the success of the latter and the continuation of the 
Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland. William of Orange became somewhat of a mythological figure 
to the Protestant community and continues to feature prominently in unionist and loyalist 
iconography. Conflict escalated after this conquest, particularly in the North where English and 
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Scottish Plantations had confiscated a large portion of land and attempts at colonisation were 
much more repressive, and most notably culminated in the United Irishmen Rebellion in 1798. 
This rebellion was the first that can be seen to have found inspiration in international 
movements; encouraged by the American and French Revolutions, the United Irishmen – who 
were initially created by Protestants, not Catholics, seeking independence from Britain – 
attempted to liberate the island from oppressive British rule. The leader of this group was Wolfe 
Tone, an irreplaceable figure to the modern republican movement whose protestations that he 
viewed “the union of Ireland with Great Britain as the scourge of the Irish nation” stimulated 
anti-British ideology for future militant groups.
1
 The Orange Order, a strictly Protestant 
fraternity, ballooned in membership and begun to expressly act out against the burgeoning 
republican community, contributing to a fracturing of social relations. As described by one 
concerned ‘Citizen,’ Orange Lodge members “practised cruelties that would disgrace the most 
uncivilised society” for no other purpose than to protect the supremacy of the Protestant 
Ascendancy.
2
  
In the late 1800s the rural peasantry began to agitate for better working rights against 
(predominantly Protestant and English) tenants who were seen to be exploiting them. This began 
a period of republican attacks, including a string of bombings in England. Catholic migration to 
Belfast also augmented, prompting an increase in sectarian tensions, and in 1886 British Prime 
Minister William Gladstone’s attempt to create Irish Home Rule elicited a hugely negative 
response from unionists. In particular the Orange Order’s militancy grew as they believed that 
the creation of an Irish government would enshrine the primacy of the Catholic population; this 
                                                            
1 Theobald Wolfe Tone, “Speech to the Court Martial, assembled to pass sentence on his life,” November 10, 1798, 
in William Sampson, Memoirs of William Sampson (New York: George Forman, 1807), 381. 
2 Citizen, Observations on the meaning of the words, Protestant Ascendancy, and Orangemen; including some 
Strictures on Other Parts, of the Answer of Patrick Duigenan, L.L.D., Judge of the Prerogative Court, to Mr. 
Grattan: Addressed to the Learned Doctor (Dublin: A. Smith, 1798), 17-18. 
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was a great catalyst for further sectarian violence. Agitation then led to the Easter Rising of 
1916, a particularly salient moment in Irish history which secured the notion that republicanism 
would present a fundamental challenge to the authority of the British state in Ireland. While it 
was an immediate failure, the execution of its leaders became a rallying point for other Irish 
nationalists and perpetuated a belief that Irish sociocultural identity was worth personal sacrifice; 
these sentiments took hold and the events of April 1916 became mythological to republicans.
3
 In 
1921, after a period of violence driven by the IRA, Partition occurred; the six counties of 
Northern Ireland – Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry and Tyrone – were split 
from the 26 others in the South, with both halves to still be governed by Britain.
4
 The six 
counties were all contained in the province of Ulster, and despite the fact that a remaining three 
Ulster counties were now in the southern state this name became a symbol of identity for 
Protestants in the North. Conflict over both territories’ status as British continued and in 
December the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed, creating what became known as the Irish Free 
State until a new Constitution created the Republic of Ireland (Éire) in 1937. In the North the 
IRA continued a campaign seeking to reunify with the South, including aligning with Germany 
in WWII and escalating a post-war ‘Border Campaign’, but after 1961 had essentially completely 
stopped being operational. 
Towards the late 1960s, when communal violence began to escalate, the IRA had been 
considerably weakened. An internal IRA document seized by police in 1966 admitted as much, 
citing “a dwindling of public support” and a lack of “awareness and understanding of the reasons 
                                                            
3 Patrick Colm Hogan, “The sacrificial emplotment of national identity: Pádraic Pearse and the 1916 Easter 
uprising,” Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology 5, no. 1 (2014): 30. 
4 There is considerable controversy over whether or not the correct name is ‘Londonderry’ or ‘Derry’ and both have 
separate political connotations. For the purposes of this thesis the name ‘Londonderry’ will be used, as per a 2007 
High Court decision. See Kieron Tourish, “Stroke city to remain Londonderry,” BBC, January 25, 2007, accessed 
October 3, 2017, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/6297907.stm.  
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and nature of the struggle” amongst the community as being key reasons for the IRA’s ceasing of 
military action after a prolonged campaign in the 1950s.
5
 In the late 1960s internal publications 
showed that the organisation was committed to improving their public image and making more 
obvious the political rationalisations they were basing their militancy around. The level that this 
militancy was to reach, however, was contentious within the organisation especially when 
communal tension escalated into violence in mid-1969. The Official IRA, seeking a stronger 
emphasis on political cooperation and promoting Marxism as the ideal means to achieve unity, 
supported mainstream political involvement instead of violent action; the Provisionals – 
beginning as a splinter group but shortly overtaking the OIRA in membership – believed instead 
that the IRA’s function was a military one and that all vestiges of British authority over the 
island as a whole should be rejected. Abstention from governments, including the Irish Dáil, was 
for the Provisionals the only consistent way to demonstrate that these governments were 
illegitimate – and indeed the only way to adhere to traditional republican ideology. Breakaway 
IRA members were also frustrated by the OIRA’s reluctance to pre-emptively arm against 
loyalist aggression in vulnerable Catholic areas of Belfast and saw this unwillingness as a major 
contributor to the levels of violence the community had experienced during rioting in August 
1969. The weakness of republican paramilitarism was such that “there was said to be little to no 
organisation in effect at the time,” a description that demonstrates that the IRA could not have 
been the conflict’s initial antagonist.6 These differences became so fundamental that OIRA and 
PIRA became incontrovertibly separate groups and acted as different organisations – sometimes 
using violence against each other – before OIRA’s official ceasefire in 1972 (although conflict, 
                                                            
5 Bob Purdie, Politics in the Streets: The origins of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland (Belfast: The 
Blackstaff Press, 1990), 126. 
6 David McKittrick et al., Lost Lives: The stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the 
Northern Ireland troubles (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1999), 33. 
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especially between the groups, did sporadically continue for another decade). The rise of PIRA 
after the August 1969 riots, with explicitly militaristic intentions, was of concern to state forces 
as it presented the clearest threat of republican dissent since the early 1950s. 
 
The Northern Ireland Civil Rights campaign, headed by the Association of the same name 
(NICRA), was formally established in early 1967 initially as a body that was determined to 
protect and defend basic rights and freedoms and to provide a legal response to institutional 
abuses of power.
7
 At this point it did not undertake demonstrations or civil disobedience and was 
relatively ineffective in capturing widespread public attention – a fact that logically separates the 
organisation’s creation from the aims of republican paramilitaries that prioritised physical 
militancy over political agitation. In 1968, however, propelled by the success of the civil rights 
campaign in America, NICRA and its affiliated groups began to stage public protests against 
discrimination towards the Catholic community. The first demonstration was in response to 
perceived discrimination in public housing, exemplified by an event in which a Catholic family 
squatting in a council house was evicted when the home was allocated to a 19-year-old single 
Protestant woman who was the secretary of a Unionist party candidate.
8
 This prompted a sit-
down protest undertaken by the Derry Housing Action Committee, which was followed a month 
later by a larger march that was met by loyalist counter-demonstrators. These initial 
demonstrations were relatively peaceful but the next, taking place in Londonderry, provoked 
days of rioting after clashes between protesters and the RUC – the latter being particularly 
violent. Images of police hitting demonstrators with batons and deploying water cannons were 
shown internationally to great criticism. 96 people were injured during the police’s “baton 
                                                            
7 Purdie, Politics in the Streets, 133. 
8 Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie, Northern Ireland: A Chronology of the Troubles 1968-1993 (Dublin: Gill & 
Macmillan Ltd, 1993), 2. 
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charge,” something that contributed dramatically to the existing thought that state institutions did 
not view the Catholic community with the same respect – or adherence to the rule of law – as 
they did the Protestant community.
9
 The ultimate consequences of this event were twofold: 
firstly, the Civil Rights campaign became more militant with the creation of the radical People’s 
Democracy group, and secondly, it badly damaged the RUC’s reputation in the Catholic and 
republican communities.
10
 Ironically by attempting to stifle protesters this became an example 
that radically strengthened their cause. The number of protests compounded, and were often met 
again with both police and loyalist aggression. As will be examined later the actions of the RUC 
at various protests in 1968 and 1969 demonstrated without doubt that a level of prejudice existed 
in its views on the Catholic population, which was a definitive reason in the growth of 
paramilitary activity. In places like the Bogside outside of Londonderry city, a staunchly 
Catholic neighbourhood that was to become particularly dangerous for security forces to operate 
in, police misconduct was particularly damaging and led to the creation of strict ‘no-go’ areas 
that were maintained by paramilitary force from 1969-72. The protection of these areas was 
important as residents believed that they were the only way to avoid violent altercations with the 
RUC. 
As the Cameron Commission Report into “Disturbances in Northern Ireland” established, 
the Civil Rights campaign began to gain traction when it did for a number of reasons. 
“Traditional patterns of antagonism” were no longer sustainable against a growing, educated 
Catholic middle-class that was more aware of the embedded political and social disadvantages 
                                                            
9 Kevin O’Kelly, “Policemen to the front of us, policemen to the back of us… no way out,” RTÉ, February 2, 1972, 
accessed September 14, 2017, http://www.rte.ie/archives/exhibitions/1031-civil-rights-movement-1968-9/1034-
derry-5-october-1968/319378-background-to-march/. 
10 The Honourable Lord Cameron, D.D.C., Disturbances in Northern Ireland: Report of the Commission appointed 
by the Governor of Northern Ireland, Presented to Parliament by Command of His Excellency the Governor of 
Northern Ireland, September 1969 (Belfast: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1969), Chapter 14. 
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they faced that their Protestant counterparts did not.
11
 As the campaign continued and RUC 
actions in particular became violent, the Catholic community necessarily came to view the police 
force as unjust and an example of embedded discrimination along sectarian lines. The Cameron 
Report acknowledged that the role of the RUC in “rousing passions and inspiring hostility” 
within marginalised communities directly provoked subsequent rioting and a more tenacious 
adoption of the civil disobedience campaign.
12
 As the IRA themselves acknowledged, their 
initial difficulty in gaining support was due to a lack of demand or connection to the republican 
cause within the community – as the organisation’s journal summarised, “when people are 
apathetic they are lazy about thinking.” 13 This meant that, when events begun to affect the 
Catholic population, the community rationally began to support to the primary group that had 
historically supported their rights. Thus a population that had begun to recognise the institutional 
biases against them, a realisation driven by the Civil Rights movement, begun to be propelled to 
at least accept the existence of paramilitaries when legitimate state forces appeared to be acting 
against that population. This is the most direct correlation between the rise of the Civil Rights 
movement and the rise of militant republicanism, and demonstrates that the outbreak of violence 
occurred in a complex political landscape with a variety of contributing actors. Many analyses of 
the Troubles conflagrate NICRA with the IRA but deign to understand why both groups played 
an important role in the Catholic community and thus understand how separate the two 
organisations were. 
To understand better the discrimination that Catholics faced in Northern Ireland it is 
important to discover how it was perceived by the Protestant community. This exercise is aided 
                                                            
11 Cameron, Disturbances in Northern Ireland, Chapter 11. 
12 Cameron, D.D.C., Disturbances in Northern Ireland, Chapter 14. 
13 “The Movement & The Image It Portrays,” An tÓglách, December 1967, accessed August 25, 2017, 
http://www.clririshleftarchive.org/document/view/427/. 
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by examining unionist literature, which is often both condemning of Catholic claims of 
prejudicial treatment and at times illogical in its arguments against loyalist involvement in 
provocation or violence. One of the major scholarly efforts to present a case for political 
unionism, The Northern Ireland Question: Myth and Reality, seeks to do so almost purely by 
framing republican ideology as fundamentally illogical and delegitimating the claims of 
discrimination against Catholics that often are cited as the early reasons for the escalation of 
violence in the late 1960s. In a key contribution to this volume, Christopher Hewitt posits that 
there was a direct correlation between civil rights activism and the escalation of violence, and 
indeed that militancy was an inevitable outcome of a Catholic-driven civil rights campaign. As 
will be discussed in the following chapter, this reading of the public protests of the 1960s utterly 
refuses to acknowledge the existence of violent unionist counterdemonstrations and the social 
effect these had on propagating militancy as a valid means of political expression. It also places 
no weight on the actions of the RUC, despite inquisitorial findings that suggest that this state-led 
violence directly provoked continuing social agitation. Hewitt’s essay attempts to use other 
ethnic conflicts as evidence to suggest that violence, or even non-violent dissent - despite 
economic or social disadvantage - was not inevitable, and that these examples prove that the civil 
rights movement was based on nationalism instead of as a reaction to discrimination. He 
explicitly ponders what is to him an apparent dichotomy: “Supposedly government 
discrimination against northern Irish Catholics was a major factor in provoking the civil rights 
movement and the consequent violence. Yet in the late fifties in New Brunswick and the South 
Tyrol, comparable inequities produced no such response.”14 Comparing completely different 
societies with utterly different histories reads as irrelevant; many state actions now recognised as 
                                                            
14 Christopher Hewitt, “The roots of violence: Catholic grievances and Irish nationalism during the civil rights 
period,” in The Northern Ireland Question: Myth and Reality, ed. Patrick J. Roche and Brian Barton (Aldershot: 
Avebury, 1991), 34. 
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being situationally inappropriate had stemmed from a lack of understanding of the complex 
socio-political landscape of the region. It also immediately suggests that discrimination directly 
led to violence, which is a remarkably simplistic reading of what was a highly complex political 
climate. Hewitt also presents a highly contentious argument that suggests that Catholic 
“educational aspirations” and “work habits” were necessarily lesser than those of Protestants and 
because of this “the assumption that Catholics, if not discriminated against, would have a similar 
socio-economic position to Protestants is probably invalid.”15 Clearly this language is highly 
inflammatory; it is not difficult to locate, here, a sense of ingrained sectarian division. For this to 
be so visible in academic writing indicates that the level of communal detachment between 
Catholic and Protestant communities was experienced in not only less-educated circles. 
An essay on employment differentials relies on data from state administrative bodies such 
as the Fair Employment Agency to demonstrate that widespread job discrimination towards the 
Catholic community was a myth, but fails to acknowledge that bias within state agencies may 
have skewed how this data was reported on or collected.
16
 In fact this agency was not created 
until 1976, far after the Civil Rights movement begun their campaign and after violence had 
reached its zenith, and therefore any data related to it is somewhat irrelevant if being used to 
describe the employment situation a decade before. The FEA was created under the Fair 
Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976, which gives provisions that indicate that the Agency 
was only able to investigate employers that had both signed a Fair Employment declaration and 
had had a complaint made against them; there was no automatic review process for compliant 
companies. Further, achieving prosecution was very rare – for the complainant, “the burden of 
                                                            
15 Ibid, 24.  
16 Paul A. Compton, "Employment differentials in Northern Ireland and job discrimination: a critique," in The 
Northern Ireland Question: Myth and Reality, ed. Patrick J. Roche and Brian Barton (Aldershot: Avebury, 
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proof required is so great that the complainant seldom proceeds with court action.”17 There is 
brief acknowledgement that this remedial process was arduous and prevented people from 
reporting instances of discrimination, and that levels of education between the communities did 
differ, but these variables are ultimately not considered in final analysis. In this essay Paul 
Compton also suggests that static higher Catholic unemployment “is a function of the labour 
market mechanism in Northern Ireland” and therefore “resistant” to potential government policy, 
a simplistic analysis that denies any impacts on the economy driven by social factors or 
ingrained cultural discrimination.
18
 It is not an exaggeration to propose that, without these 
variables, the labour market would only reflect social demographics more correctly; to express 
that a minority community’s underemployment is a natural economic function – and that 
therefore it should remain as it is – is ludicrous and dangerous. It is also a devastatingly easy 
conclusion to come to without acknowledging two obvious factors: animosity between 
Protestants and Catholics existed to a great degree, and the majority of people in high-ranking or 
well-paying jobs – those who made employment decisions – were Protestants.19 As in Hewitt’s 
entry, there is a sense of communal segregation simply within the paper’s language; listed as 
potential reasons for job discrimination are the generalisations that “Protestants are perceived to 
be better workers,” and “Catholics are thought to be a security risk.”20 Evidently these 
stereotypes constitute discrimination regardless of how widespread or commonplace they were 
as ideas. These entries into dominant unionist literature constitute a remarkable example of how 
Catholic grievances were denied by those with social capital and that public protest and agitation 
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outside of mainstream political structures was incredibly important in making the wider 
community sympathetic to the discrimination that did occur.  
 
Something often unexamined sufficiently in literature – a factor that Myth and Reality seeks to 
totally negate – is the rationality of the emergence of groups like the IRA. Certainly, the 
organisation had an extensive history before the 1970s and was involved in violent anti-state 
activity before the modern Troubles, but its expansion at this time can be understood on largely 
rational terms. It is equally relevant to note that the Protestant Ulster Volunteers – a direct 
predecessor of the UVF – had existed since the early twentieth century, and that state violence 
against Catholics had a tradition that was institutionalised by the Ulster Special Constabulary 
(USC or B-Specials) that was to become the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). That violence 
escalated at all these levels is not coincidental as their respective histories demonstrate that the 
three were mutually reinforcing and traditionally in conflict with one another. There is a great 
deal of evidence to establish that many IRA recruits joined not because they fundamentally 
believed in the principles of Irish republicanism per se, but because they had experienced state-
sanctioned violence and repression in their own communities. Martin McGuinness, who as leader 
of Sinn Féin was to become the deputy First Minister and was vital in peace process 
negotiations, expressed that he “would have been ashamed not to join the IRA” after living in 
Londonderry during the conflict’s early years having had viewed and experienced antagonism by 
the Army and the RUC against his community.
21
 Other ex-IRA members described their feeling 
that “the war came to them” rather than them being involved in provocation or incitement of 
violence; after viewing how soldiers and police treated them, along with events like Bloody 
                                                            
21 Sophie Elmhirst, ““I’d have been ashamed not to join the IRA”,” New Statesman, October 26, 2011, accessed 
August 28, 2017, http://www.newstatesman.com/europe/2011/10/mcguinness-ireland-campaign.  
22 
 
Sunday, there was a widespread belief that the community was under attack.
22
 A study by White 
in 1989 supported this, finding that membership accelerated directly after instances where 
security forces had killed civilians (described as “unorganised repression”) and after prohibitive 
policy such as internment was introduced (“organised repression”).23 Indeed, Bosi’s 2012 study 
of IRA volunteers’ pathways to joining the paramilitary struggle found that, in most cases, 
engagement “was triggered by one particular, transformative event” such as the implementation 
of internment policies or Bloody Sunday.
24
 Volunteers were also driven by a sense of great 
injustice, especially after the 1969 riots which saw five times as many Catholic families 
intimidated out of their Belfast homes than their Protestant counterparts.
25
 Communal anger 
against such events and a perceived lack of will by the security forces to protect Catholic areas of 
the city understandably led to vigilantism, driven by a sense of urgency and a lack of alternative 
option. Specific instances of RUC brutality extended this perceived need, including many of the 
first Troubles-related deaths in 1969. The death of Samuel Devenney, who died from injuries 
sustained when RUC officers entered his house in pursuit of rioters, became a pivotal example to 
the Catholic community of Londonderry that the police force were neither accountable nor 
impartial; the officers responsible were never prosecuted for their role in his death. Devenney 
and his family were assaulted with clubs, him being hospitalised “with a suspected fractured 
skull, wounds to his eyes and mouth, a heart attack and internal injuries.”26 None of his family 
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were taking part in rioting, nor were connected to any republican group. This case remains 
controversial as it was decided after investigation in 2001 that, despite damning evidence of 
police brutality against many members of the Devenney family, no RUC officers would face 
disciplinary action as too much time had passed.
27
  
Events in August 1969 during heavy rioting proved again to the community that the RUC 
was willing to act without apparent concern for human life. On the 14
th
 August four Catholic 
civilians were killed by police, none of whom were posing any threat to the security services. 
The first two, nine-year-old Patrick Rooney and bus drive Samuel McLarnon, were inside their 
homes when shots were fired. In the Rooney case the RUC was found to be completely 
unjustified in shooting, as all fire was directed towards Belfast’s Divis Tower flats where no 
gunfire was present; in the second, the street that McLarnon lived on was the location of a fierce 
riot in which police fire did hit surrounding houses.
28
 The third man killed, Michael Lynch, was 
shot as he walked across a street during a riot, but was confirmed as a bystander by the Scarman 
Report into the disturbances.
29
 The fourth killed by police was shot by B Specials in a 
particularly controversial incident in which shots were fired into a crowd dispersing after a 
NICRA meeting. The Scarman tribunal found this to constitute “grave misconduct,” and noted 
that the actions of the B Specials after the event were particularly concerning; the commander in 
charge did not report the incident, all arms were cleaned when the party returned to a RUC 
station, and no report of any shooting was given.
30
 To the tribunal itself all B Specials present 
denied opening fire and none of the platoon ever faced prosecution. It was necessarily alarming 
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to the population that the majority of victims in the riots were not killed by sectarian dissent, but 
by police actions: “Many Catholics unsurprisingly saw police killings as evidence of the hostility 
of the northern state towards their community: not only were the police offering inadequate 
protection, they were, on occasion, the attackers from whom protection was so urgently 
required.”31 In a situation such as this it is unsurprising that alternative methods of protection 
were sought out and established, despite how they may have contravened existing legal 
procedures. To marginalised groups that had experienced police brutality state forces themselves 
were seen to have contravened their legislated powers and so paramilitary protection was viewed 
as a reasonable and necessary response.  
Although the initial arrival of the Army brought a sense of optimism to Catholic society, as 
it had the potential to reduce RUC brutality and bias, tensions soon developed and became 
incontrovertibly damaged. For staunchly republican communities, British illegitimacy meant that 
the Army was an invasive, occupying force that required retaliation against. The depth and 
seriousness of this ideology is crucial to understand in order to evaluate the rationality or 
inevitability of the existence of paramilitary groups. Additionally, that the geography of Northern 
Ireland was so segregated meant that particular areas would necessarily be highly resistant to the 
involvement of outside force. As travel writer Dervla Murphy discovered in the border region of 
County Armagh, “The whole concept of an ‘illegal organisation’ is utterly meaningless in certain 
areas under certain circumstances. To the people of South Armagh the Brits are the illegal army, 
occupying their territory against the will of virtually the entire population.”32 The fragmentation 
and separation of communities of different political or religious persuasion meant that this view 
was maintained and cemented over a long period of time, the effect of which was to create a 
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belief so strong that its protection by violence was considered necessary. Certain actions of the 
Army, as will be discussed later, also cast them as an enemy of the Catholic community and 
provided further evidence to republicans that it was an illegitimate force with no jurisdiction in 
Northern Ireland.  
Northern Ireland is a good example of the sentiment that “culture, like the class or group to 
which it belongs, is born and develops in struggle with other cultures.”33 In this way one can 
understand the Northern Catholic community’s culture as being shaped in opposition to 
Protestant communities’ culture, and vice versa. Separateness between the two societies in this 
way became dangerous, as Rolston suggests, because their respective roles were imbued with 
political and historical meaning and power had always been imbalanced: 
 
“Unionist culture was in the ascendant from the partition of Ireland in 1921 because the 
unionist ruling class was in control of the state. This cultural hegemony thus invaded 
almost every aspect of civil society. For their part, nationalists were offered subordination. 
This subordination and the responses to it affected nationalist cultural expression.”34  
 
Thus unionist culture became civic culture, while nationalist culture was restricted and officially 
viewed as combative or resistant to the state. In a city like Belfast this meant that murals to 
celebrate unionist or loyalist figureheads were positioned in more prominent locations than were 
incarnations of nationalist imagery, because to have otherwise would be to present a visible and 
provocative challenge to institutional power. As the conflict drew on, however, republican 
iconography became more identifiable and was displayed to a higher degree in shared public 
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space. Part of this, as was noted in the rise of the Civil Rights movement, was that the Catholic 
community were becoming increasingly discontent with their place in society; another important 
reason was because, as a nationalist or – at its extreme – a separatist movement, an international 
language of republican iconography had been established by previous guerrilla movements. 
Depictions of weaponry, paramilitary uniforms and face-covered soldiers were easily identified 
by a global audience as being part of a reactionary, anti-state armed campaign. Republican 
murals also included (and continue to show) displays of solidarity towards other independence 
movements, including paintings on the ‘Solidarity Wall’ on the Falls Road that acknowledges 
conflicts in the Basque region and Palestine.
35
 Events during the Troubles provided 
contemporary reminders of the struggle, with paintings of the martyred 1981 hunger strikers 
particularly prominent and easily recognisable by both communities. Loyalism lacked this vital 
attachment to pictorial symbolism, instead having to rely on less potent imagery of British flags, 
depictions of centuries-old historical events, and commemorations for members of paramilitary 
organisations that did not hold the political clout or widespread community support that the IRA 
enjoyed. For Rolston, “unionism in its expansionist heyday turned easily to murals as a sign of 
ascendancy, but was less able to do so as ascendancy became more and more questioned.”36 As 
convincing political arguments for unionism dwindled republican political and social capital 
grew, with public murals constituting an important mechanism for displaying this newfound 
support. Anti-British imagery in public spaces did much to perpetuate and bolster republican 
ideology in the wider community. 
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To deepen the complexities of paramilitary involvement in Northern Ireland, breakaway groups 
– and the kinds of violence they employed – are often not analysed in enough depth as separate 
entities from their original organisations. The current incarnations of the IRA, the Continuity 
IRA (CIRA) and the Real IRA (RIRA), were created from splinter groups of PIRA after the 1994 
ceasefire and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement respectively. Both groups were created after 
reactionary splits in protest over PIRA’s decisions to cooperate more passively with the Irish and 
British governments. For CIRA this occurred after a decision in 1994 to allow PIRA members to 
take seats in the Dáil Éireann, while RIRA was created in response to a 1997 ceasefire during the 
peace process that would eventually lead to the Good Friday Agreement. They continue to exist, 
although are operationally limited and have very little support amongst the community. A merger 
in 2012 with the vigilante group Republican Action Against Drugs saw RIRA be incorporated 
into the ‘New IRA,’ an organisation that today is primarily focused on punishing drug dealers 
within the nationalist community. None of these groups gained nearly the amount of traction as 
the Officials or Provisionals did and are usually implicated in instances of vigilantism or 
organisational infighting. The violence RIRA adopted in the Good Friday Agreement’s 
immediate aftermath, however, was of an unprecedented and disturbing temerity. 
In 1998 the second-largest bombing of the Troubles was committed by the Real IRA in the 
town of Omagh in County Tyrone. On the 15th August that year a car bomb killed 29 people and 
injured over 300 more, to widespread and politically unanimous condemnation. The explosion, 
which went off on a busy Saturday afternoon, was especially devastating as police had been 
given inaccurate warnings before its detonation; instead of evacuating people to safety, they were 
shepherded towards the actual location of the bomb. Descriptions of the aftermath are horrifying: 
witnesses described “human bodies torn to pieces,” bodies and limbs stuck in shop windows and 
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amongst the wreckage, and a burst water main causing “bits and pieces of legs, arms, whatever… 
floating down the street.”37 The attack caused great uproar in dominant republican circles, with 
Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams stating his unequivocal condemnation and chief negotiator 
Martin McGuinness similarly denouncing the act as appalling and “designed to wreck the 
[peace] process.”38 Instead of doing so, however, it strengthened the determination of politicians 
across the spectrum to secure a lasting peace and caused other paramilitary organisations, such as 
the republican Irish National Liberation Army, to pledge to ceasefires. The Taoiseach, Bertie 
Ahern, and British PM Tony Blair both condemned it as a direct attack against the 
democratically-supported Good Friday Agreement and acknowledged that RIRA was not truly 
aligned to dominant republicanism: in Blair’s words, “a small group of extremists with no moral 
or political support anywhere.”39 This analysis was bolstered by the fact that the bomb had 
targeted no particular group of people but instead its victims “read like a microcosm of troubles 
deaths, and left no section of Irish life untouched.”40 
The Real IRA’s campaign until this point had been in reaction to the signing of the Good 
Friday Agreement, which they fundamentally disagreed with and viewed as incompatible with 
traditional republican ideology. That Omagh occurred after the Agreement and caused such 
devastating loss of life cemented the IRA’s position as primarily culpable for Troubles 
violence in contemporary popular memory. Several factors, however, separate the IRA in the late 
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1960s and 1970s and the IRA at the turn of the century; the Provisional IRA, having committed 
to a still-ongoing ceasefire in 1997, was no longer operational and instead the dissident groups 
styling themselves as IRA splinter associations undertook attacks which did not reflect how 
modern republican thought had developed. PIRA had consistently apologised or expressed regret 
for acts which claimed civilian lives, preferring to target members of the British Army or the 
police force. PIRA remained closely aligned with Sinn Féin, which was a vital actor in the peace 
process, and supported the party’s efforts at furthering the Irish republican cause through 
democratic process. Of course, arguments suggesting that splinter IRA groups are different 
entities to the traditional IRA do not acknowledge that new stylings are essentially just 
fundamental reincarnations of old republican ideology. What differentiates IRA breakaway 
violence from the violence of renegade brigades in Protestant paramilitaries is mainly internal 
discipline; the command structure of the IRA has typically been incredibly strong, with dissident 
groups needing to have a distinct and coherent ideology in order to consolidate a separate 
membership. The politics of the Provisionals did adapt to the times, so to speak; a deeper 
involvement in conventional politics, despite this being contrary to the traditional principles of 
Irish republicanism, was developed as it became clear that the socio-political landscape was 
changing. For the majority of republicans Omagh represented a fundamentally incorrect reading 
of this developed republicanism by RIRA, which was not widely supported by the community.
41
 
A September 1998 interview with an anonymous IRA spokesperson confirmed this, stating that 
this new group had “hijacked” and “tarnished the name of Óglaigh na hÉireann,” and had split 
from the IRA as their “views on future strategy” had been unequivocally rejected by the 
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leadership.
42
 Requests from a number of RIRA members to transfer back to PIRA, horrified at 
the organisation’s action, was a further indication that the Omagh bombing did not reflect 
majority republican thought.
43
 The damage this event did to lasting popular memory was 
devastating, however, as it was the last major attack of the Troubles; the Omagh bombing, 
despite being undertaken by an unsupported and institutionally rejected dissident group, had the 
consequence of casting Irish republicanism on the whole as particularly brutal and utterly 
resistant to peace negotiations. This is an image that continues to plague republican politics and 
propagates the idea that the IRA holds primary and majority responsibility for the violence of the 
Troubles. 
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Chapter Two 
Unionism, loyalism and pro-state violence 
 
Loyalism, the opposing ideology to republicanism (and their respective constitutional 
counterparts unionism and nationalism), is often far more difficult to understand in a modern 
context. Steve Bruce has posited that the diminutive size of literature on loyalism stems from its 
unpopularity as a subject among academics, because, as he contends, “the university-educated 
middle classes have difficulty understanding why anyone would fight for something as 
insubstantial as patriotism.”1 Indeed, Northern Irish unionism and loyalism are difficult concepts 
to understand, not least because there is a lack of political coherence between and within them. 
Loyalist paramilitaries were notoriously in contest with each other during the Troubles, and 
working-class Protestants – regardless of any potential affiliation with loyalists – often perceived 
that their disenfranchisement was exacerbated by the policies of mainstream unionist parties. 
Institutional unionism was not typically progressive, if anything because adopting any kind of 
socialist policy would veer too close to the political territory occupied by republican parties, and 
deviation from the principles of the British Union would undermine its basic foundations. This 
was so irrespective of the fact that most of those principles no longer existed elsewhere in 
Britain. Another facet of the unionist experience of the Troubles was religion, to a greater extent 
than in republican communities, and loyalist paramilitarism was supplemented by outspoken and 
oftentimes blatantly sectarian Protestant laymen that produced propaganda and provided pseudo-
religious basis for attacking Catholic communities. Unionism and loyalism have also been 
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notoriously resistant to adaption: a “countervailing propensity to atavism,” driven by prominent 
political leaders, has rendered these ideologies relatively unable to adjust to socially progressive 
ideas that will only continue to gain popular traction in the wider community.
2
 
Arthur Aughey’s essay on unionist ideology, whilst informative, still does not produce a 
clear set of political objectives to base violent loyalism on. The essay, published in Roche and 
Barton’s Myth and Reality, is similar to the other essays in the compilation in its inability to truly 
be convincing in defining and defending the ideology; its various descriptions of unionism 
present a confusing and incoherent political picture. For Aughey, “Unionists are never loyal to 
mere governments but to those constitutional requirements necessary to maintain and secure the 
supremacy of the protestant way of life” yet, with no apparent contradiction, “unionism 
embraces a political allegiance the nature of which is to allow one to express whatever cultural 
value or identity one wishes.”3 Clearly, if the ‘supremacy’ of Protestantism is stressed above all 
else – and enshrined in the definition of the union itself – the ability of others to perform their 
non-Protestant identity is severely undermined. This definition also provides justification for the 
forceful protection of Protestant supremacy, an idea that loyalists certainly used to bolster their 
claims to political legitimacy. This is a particularly dangerous behaviour to justify as it reinforces 
a pre-existing and well-documented mentality within Northern Ireland Protestant communities 
that they are under siege, a psychological phenomenon identifiable since the Plantation era that 
describes the lasting Protestant fear that they will come under attack from their Catholic 
neighbours.
4
 It is undeniable that social politics in the Republic of Ireland during the Troubles 
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was not enviable or progressive by any means – divorce remained illegal until 1996 and over-
the-counter contraception was not legalised until 1985 – and that this did constitute a reasonable 
argument for remaining within the more secular United Kingdom.
5
 The Ne Temere decree that 
operated in the Republic, a directive from the Vatican created in the early twentieth century that 
meant that any mixed Protestant-Catholic marriages had to agree to raise their children in the 
Catholic faith, was also highly contentious. The Irish Constitution also presented a direct threat 
to the Protestants in the North: Article 2 stated that “The national territory consists of the whole 
island of Ireland,” while Article 3 detailed the “right of the parliament and government... to 
exercise jurisdiction over the whole territory”.6 These provisions presented a clear, legally-
enshrined threat to Protestant hegemony in Northern Ireland, and cemented the notion that the 
‘South’ was necessarily on the side of republicans. They provided some justification for the 
‘siege mentality’ and presented the Republic as being necessarily antagonistic towards the 
unionist state, despite not having any practical legal power. As a provision of the Good Friday 
Agreement the articles were modified after a referendum in the Republic. Article 2 now 
establishes “the entitlement and birthright” of those born anywhere in the island to “be part of the 
Irish Nation,” and Article 3 expresses that it is the will of the Irish Nation to incorporate the 
whole diaspora, but that this should only be done peacefully and with the democratic will of the 
majority of its inhabitants.
7
 
 
                                                            
5 Government of Ireland, Health (Family Planning) (Amendment) Act, 1985 (Dublin: Houses of the Oireachtas, 
1985), accessed August 3, 2017, http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1985/act/4/enacted/en/html; Government of 
Ireland, Family Law (Divorce) Act, 1996 (Dublin: Houses of the Oireachtas, 1996), accessed August 3, 2017, 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1996/act/33/enacted/en/html. 
6 Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland) (Dublin: The Stationery Office, 1937). 
7 Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland), Nineteenth Amendment (Dublin: The Stationery Office, 1998). 
34 
 
Violent loyalism, unlike nationalism, could never adequately proclaim to be engaged in a civil 
war of any legitimacy. To begin with the ideology was positioned on side of the hegemonic 
power in question – while it may not have always supported British positions on Northern 
Ireland, and indeed fiercely rejected certain decisions made by the government, it still suggested 
that taking up arms was necessary to preserve the Union – including the state-sanctioned military 
forces that power provided to the region. This did, at times, present a difficulty for loyalist 
organisations as they were essentially in competition with legitimate security forces for recruits.
8
 
Loyalism’s second major barrier to any sort of legitimacy involves its primary target, which was 
in the vast majority of cases the Catholic civilian community. This “naked sectarianism” 
understandably shadowed loyalists’ claims to a rational political agenda, although it was 
described as a tactic that sought to undermine support for republicanism in general.
9
 It also 
highlighted the internal disarray that plagued many loyalist groups’ leadership hierarchy – a 
dysfunctionality that was very different to the IRA’s controlled and relatively stable 
organisational structure. 
Internal politics in loyalist groups certainly have a role in delegitimising their claims to be 
a cohesive force against potential republican dissent. There is significant evidence to suggest that 
criminality within the ranks of certain organisations is tolerated and indeed profitable; further 
investigation reveals a rather systematic practice of press-ganging to gain recruits and the 
collection of proceeds of crimes as a way for members to pay their dues to the organisation. 
Where the IRA may punish their recruits if caught drug dealing, loyalist paramilitaries are more 
likely to punish drug dealers in their ranks who have not given enough proceeds of this to the 
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leadership.
10
 There was also never any kind of legitimate agreement between loyalist 
paramilitary groups. The UDA and UVF were consistently feuding, and in the mid-1970s the 
groups targeted each other as much as they did members of the Catholic community; while 
infighting like this began to unfold within republican splinter groups in the 1980s, divisions in 
loyalism were always fierce and often resulted in murder. Both saw themselves as militarily 
more capable than the other and publicly denounced the other’s killings as purely sectarian, even 
though they both routinely selected sectarian targets.
11
 As with the splits in republican 
paramilitary organisations, it is incredibly difficult to understand the degree to which different 
groupings loathed each other as they were, theoretically, supporting the same end; much of the 
vitriol between groups was more to do with social dominance and control over paramilitary 
tactics than legitimate political grievance.
12
 As Andrew Silke establishes, this also drove up the 
respective memberships of the UDA and UVF, as members of the community threatened by one 
organisation would often join the other for purposes of protection.
13
  
 
Loyalist paramilitaries were responsible for 1,112 of Troubles deaths, almost one-third of the 
overall number.
14
 84% of the UVF’s and 80% of the UDA’s victims were civilians; this is 
compared to the IRA, who killed 1,771 people of which 36% were civilians.
15
 The scale of their 
killings at the start of the conflict is also vital to acknowledge, as this did much to exacerbate 
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republican action: in 1972 alone loyalist paramilitaries killed 93 Catholic civilians out of a total 
of 117 overall victims.
16
 It is thus difficult for loyalist groups to claim that they perceived 
themselves to be fighting a legitimate civil war when only approximately one-fifth of those killed 
by them could be considered a valid military target. Claims to reactionary legitimacy are also 
undermined by the fact that the first sectarian murders of the conflict were undertaken by 
loyalists, not republicans. UVF actions began in 1966 with the deaths of three Catholic civilians. 
This was before what is typically considered ‘the Troubles’ but is greatly important in 
establishing how community relations were highly strained before 1969, and demonstrates that 
Protestant paramilitaries were operating before this time also. At this time, republican violence 
was largely unorganised and unprepared to enter into confrontation with loyalists, whose 
groupings had remained more cohesive. This is a clear indication of the fact that IRA actions 
alone did were not the catalyst for the violence of the Troubles; as Richard English explains, 
“political violence in the north – in these cases, loyalist violence – clearly predated the Provos’ 
establishment.”17 The first person to die, John Scullion, was shot on his way home from a bar in 
Belfast on June 11; a statement from one of the accused said that Scullion had drunkenly yelled 
“up the Rebels” and this was the reason he was shot by the UVF group.18 The second, Peter 
Ward, had been drinking with three Catholic friends at a bar off the Shankill Road (a staunchly 
Protestant area, though at this time sectarian geography did not present as much of a danger as it 
was to become). All four were shot at as they left, by the same gang that killed Scullion, but 
Ward was the only fatality.
19
 Matilda Goula, a Protestant, was the third victim – her home was 
fire-bombed, mistaken for the Catholic-owned bar she lived next to, and she died of these 
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injuries. Before the attack the bar had been graffitied with the slogans “This house is owned by a 
Taig – Popehead – Remember 1690.”20 The blatant sectarianism apparent in all three deaths 
clearly had an impact on a community that until this point had existed relatively harmoniously 
with its Protestant neighbours. 
A salient example of loyalist brutality, directed specifically towards the civilian Catholic 
community and that was relatively elusive to state forces, exists in the Shankill Butchers gang 
that operated between 1975 and 1982 in Belfast. In its seven years in operation the gang 
murdered at least 23 people, of which the vast majority were Catholic civilians, by particularly 
disturbing methods. The Butchers’ leader was a high-ranking UVF figure named Lenny Murphy, 
who was described variously as a “psychopath” and who “committed the crimes firstly for 
pleasure”.21 Many of his accomplices described during proceedings his proclivity towards killing 
Catholics and suggested that many of the murders were undertaken for purely sectarian 
reasons. The psychological impact of a group like the Shankill Butchers – and the fact that they 
were not apprehended for years after their actions began – necessarily meant that there was a 
view amongst the Catholic population that stopping violent loyalism was not a priority for the 
security forces.  
The particularity of the Shankill Butchers’ violence established a disturbing pattern that 
placed great stress on community relations and retaliatory paramilitary action. Both religious 
communities were threatened by the Butchers: Catholics were afraid to leave their homes or walk 
alone at night for fear that they would be slain and Protestants, many with information about the 
gang, could not communicate with the authorities without the chance that they would be 
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targeted.
22
 Their first official victims were four workers at a bottling plant in Belfast, all of 
whom were shot dead on October 2
nd
, 1975. On 25
th
 November, 1975, Catholic civilian Francis 
Crossan became the gang’s first kidnapped victim. As he walked home from a bowling club he 
was abducted and driven to the Shankill district, where “Murphy, brandishing a butcher’s knife, 
cut his throat almost through to the spine.”23 The murder was blatantly sectarian and driven, as 
was later stated by one of the killers, by a drunken decision to “pick up a Taig and do him in”.24 
Explanations such as this were also given as reasons for other of the Butchers’ murders. In early 
February 1976 Catholic Thomas Quinn was murdered in similar circumstances, as was Francis 
Rice in June.
25
 The second killing was ‘claimed’ by an anonymous caller to the Sunday News in 
Belfast who told the editor he was part of a group called the ‘Young Militants’; this caller was 
Murphy, seeking to distance himself “in the event of questions being asked by the UVF 
leadership.”26 Clearly he was aware that his actions would be disapproved of, but knew that it 
would not be difficult to evade questioning by flatly denying his involvement – the leadership 
would not desire to investigate too heavily into the crimes. In August, Cornelius Neeson was “hit 
repeatedly in the head with an axe” because, according to one of those involved, the gang 
“decided to go out and get a Taig” and knew that “if someone was got walking along the 
Cliftonville Road he would be a Taig.”27 The sectarian nature of Belfast’s geography meant that 
people were identifiable as belonging to a particular religion simply by being on a certain street, 
providing easy targets for groups such as the Butchers. Five other Catholic civilians were 
murdered in similar ways from October 1976 to October 1982; four people, who had either had 
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internal disputes with the UVF or personal altercations with Murphy, also died in this time; and 
others died in random shooting and bombing attacks undertaken by the Butchers.
28
  
The gang was not caught until one victim survived his attack and was able to, with police, 
identify two of the people he had been attacked by. Gerard McLaverty had been beaten, 
restrained and had his wrists slit before his body was dumped, but he was found alive and 
managed to make identifications during his recovery.
29
 This led to the arrest and prosecution of 
11 members of the gang for 19 murders that had taken place between 1977 and 1979, two of 
whom were given life sentences but who were released in 1998 as per the Good Friday 
Agreement. Lenny Murphy, who had been in jail since 1976 on arms charges – a plea bargain 
down from attempted murder after he had shot a Catholic woman – was never made responsible 
for his involvement in any death and continued to be involved in gang operations from within 
jail.
30
 Murphy was suspected for many other murders that predated the Shankill Butchers, and 
had been imprisoned before this also. During this period of imprisonment for murder he was 
suspected of committing a crime that encapsulates his individual sadism and willingness to exact 
revenge on those who crossed him: his co-accused, Mervyn Connor, was found dead in his cell 
having been poisoned next to a note absolving Murphy of guilt. It is widely acknowledged that 
Murphy had both forced Connor to write the statement and take the cyanide that killed him after 
he had given evidence against Murphy to police.
31
 
Murphy was freed from jail in July 1982 and committed his next murder the next day, 
bludgeoning a homeless Protestant man to death at a loyalist club during a celebration for his 
                                                            
28 Ibid, 624-918. 
29 “The last victim of the Shankill Butchers,” The Irish Times, March 22, 2008, accessed September 10, 2017, 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/the-last-victim-of-the-shankill-butchers-1.906061.  
30 Bruce, The Red Hand, 177. 
31 McKittrick et al., Lost Lives, 352. 
40 
 
own release.
32
 Three other killings followed before Murphy was shot dead by the IRA outside his 
girlfriend’s home in November 1982. Evidence would suggest that the IRA did not rely solely on 
their own information to facilitate Murphy’s killing; several sources point to collusion between 
loyalists and the Provisionals, the former because Murphy was increasingly seen as uncontrolled 
and a risk to legitimately planned loyalist paramilitary operations.
33
 According to Jimmy Nesbitt, 
the head of the RUC’s division responsible for investigating the Shankill Butchers, although the 
UVF leadership were not unaware of Murphy and his associates’ actions they defied internal 
punishment because “the leadership was afraid of them.”34 Murphy had established himself as 
ruthlessly violent not only towards Catholics, but also towards those in the organisation that 
disagreed with him; he was consistently implicated in internal UVF murders or in the deaths of 
civilians that had somehow innocuously provoked him – including the September 1982 shooting 
of a man who had sold Murphy a car and had asked him to pay the money he was due.
35
 
Sectarian killing was, however, a “bone of contention” within the UVF, as indiscriminate 
violence served mostly to reinforce a common view that loyalist paramilitaries lacked political 
objectives and were simply common criminals operating under a pretence of organised 
paramilitarism.
36
 The Butchers were a salient example of a fringe group that threatened to 
destabilise the organisation as a whole and who indeed provoked a deeply fearful reaction in the 
republican and non-political Catholic communities. The killings “instilled a sense of fear” that, 
decades after the murders, was “still alive, particularly among the Catholic population.”37 
Feldman has described the Butchers’ actions as representing “symbolic genocide” due to the 
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particularity of their violence and the way they could utterly dehumanise individuals; to an 
already fractured community this was devastating.
38
 Acts such as these were also wholly 
detrimental to loyalist groups: after Murphy’s death a member of the security forces remarked 
that “it was just a matter of time before somebody got to him. A man like that was liable to be 
topped just as much by his own side. He had become an embarrassment and a liability because 
he was uncontrollable.”39 Whilst it was not the UVF’s explicit intention to harbour groups as 
brutally sectarian as the Butchers, its inability to control individual brigades meant that the 
existence of highly violent dissenting groups was entirely possible. The Shankill Butchers 
provided evidence to the wider community that paramilitary organisations did contain such 
elements. 
 
One potent event demonstrated to the nationalist community that loyalists were able to 
manipulate state forces to their benefit. The Ulster Workers’ Council strike in 1974, an incident 
which ended power-sharing in Northern Ireland and brought about Direct Rule, proved beyond 
doubt the impact unionist groups could have on the province’s politics – despite many 
organisations involved lacking clear political objectives themselves. Widespread condemnation 
by unionists of the power-sharing arrangement, which saw a heightening in the involvement of 
the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and concessions that meant that the 
Republic would have more say in Northern affairs, culminated in this watershed event. The strike 
began on May 15, the day after a motion against the Sunningdale Agreement was rejected, and 
was led by the UWC – a group that included trade union representatives along with prominent 
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members of the UDA and UVF. This agreement, which had been passed the previous December, 
included provisions for the creation of a Council of Ireland which was to be made up of seven 
members of the Northern Ireland Executive and seven of the Irish Parliament, the Dáil Éireann. 
The Council’s particular functions were never made exactly clear but were generally described in 
the Agreement as potentially having “executive and harmonising functions and a consultative 
role.”40 It was highly contentious for unionists, who viewed it as a fundamental encroachment by 
the Republic on the sovereignty of the province and an irrevocable concession to republican 
demands. They viewed it, and the whole Sunningdale Agreement by extension, as a step closer to 
Irish unification.
41
 
The first day of the strike did not start with great effectiveness, but throughout the day 
various workplaces made the decision to close and employees begun to leave – often under 
duress from hard-line loyalists who threatened to burn their cars and who were already erecting 
barricades.
42
 This was to be the pattern of the initial stages of the strike: “massive intimidation” 
ensured that Protestant workers complied to the UWC’s desires.43 A statement was issued by the 
UWC expressing that essential services would be preserved, although this ended with the 
ominous warning that “a more serious situation will arise by midnight” if the government did not 
comply with its desires.
44
 The next day a second statement was released that vehemently 
criticised the British government, who along with the BBC and UTV (Ulster Television) were 
listed as the UWC’s “enemies” due to their opposition to the strike – an opposition described as a 
                                                            
40 “The Sunningdale Agreement,” Conflict Archive on the Internet, December 1973, accessed September 12, 2017, 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/sunningdale/agreement.htm.  
41 Shaun McDaid, “The Irish Government and the Sunningdale Council of Ireland: a vehicle for unity?” Irish 
Historical Studies 38, no. 150 (2012): 293-94. 
42 Don Anderson, Fourteen May Days: The Inside Story of the Loyalist Strike of 1974 (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan 
Ltd, 1994), 29. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ulster Workers Council, “Press Statement from the Ulster Workers Council,” May 15, 1974, accessed September 
20, 2017, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/uwc/uwc-pdfs/uwcpres.pdf. 
43 
 
“vile and despicable onslaught”.45 On May 17, the strike’s third day, the UVF detonated car 
bombs in Dublin and Monaghan in the Republic, killing 33 people; loyalist culpability was not 
immediately established, however, and initial blame for the event was instead placed on 
republican paramilitaries. The strike continued with increasing ferocity as more roads and 
services were blocked, the loyalists driven by a sense of anger at the fact that Merlyn Rees, 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, refused to meet with them.  
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson was wholly opposed to cooperating with the UWC, 
stating that the government would not negotiate with groups operating unconstitutionally and 
undemocratically. His speech on the 25th May - the 11th day of striking - made this position very 
clear, much to the displeasure of the Protestant community who believed his rhetoric (he accused 
loyalists of “sponging” off the British state) was focused on them as a whole.46 This also had the 
effect of fracturing relations between the British and Irish governments, with the latter becoming 
frustrated at Britain’s seeming lack of action against loyalist strikers.47 The Army did not even 
attempt to take down loyalist barricades or intervene in the operation of power stations; the 
extent of their involvement was to ration petroleum out to those who had obtained a special 
permit. As the UWC pledged to cut more essential services the Northern Ireland Executive began 
to take a similar view as the Irish Dáil, with politicians on both sides frustrated that 
the government would not meet with loyalists or order the Army to intervene to a greater extent. 
SDLP members threatened resignation first, accusing the government of pandering to the desires 
of Army officers instead of those of the Executive itself, something that unionist MPs were also 
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highly frustrated by.
48
 On the 28
th
 May Brian Faulkner, the leader of the Executive, resigned, 
essentially ending the power-sharing Executive which had lasted a mere five months.  
The Ulster Worker’s Council did not survive long after the strike; it dissolved rapidly after 
its conclusion as its political direction became questioned. It is wholly plausible that the levels of 
intimidation used during the strike were more effective than the political reasoning behind it, and 
that once the situation no longer required such levels of coercion the wider public were not 
concerned to support the UWC’s aims any further. Another compelling reason for its eventual 
failure is that it simply was no longer necessary after successfully bringing down a cooperative, 
inter-communal government. As an organiser expressed, after the Executive had been dissolved 
“the only political forum was Westminster” – and the UWC had no supporters in that parliament 
or, indeed, much relevance.
49
 The affairs of Northern Ireland remained with Westminster until 
the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which once again contained provisions for 
the creation of a Northern Ireland power-sharing Executive. It was primarily due to the UWC 
strike in 1974 that, for the duration of the Troubles, the province was governed directly by 
Britain. That a loyalist power bloc, made up of paramilitaries who regularly demonstrated their 
willingness and capability to use violence during the strike, was able to desecrate this attempt at 
power-sharing indicates how influential they were against the state they claimed to want to 
remain a part of. 
 
Despite the relative minimal body of literature that exists on loyalist violence, the UVF 
perpetrated the incident that caused the most deaths of the Troubles when, on the 17
th
 May 1974, 
it carried out a series of bombings in the Republic that killed 33 people. The Dublin and 
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Monaghan bombings were a tragic example of loyalist paramilitary power; the incident, 
however, is often forgotten, and the culpability of loyalists in the devastation is largely 
downplayed. At the time there was a sense that the IRA’s continuing actions in Northern Ireland 
were the root cause of the bombing, and that without republican violence loyalists would not 
have targeted the Republic of Ireland; this was especially so in the immediate aftermath of the 
attack, when no culpability had been established.
50
 Investigations into the event were halted after 
only a few months, something that continues to draw great criticism from victims’ families and 
those who were injured in the blasts.   
Three car bombs went off at approximately 5:30pm on a Friday afternoon in Dublin, with 
another following in the town of Monaghan ninety minutes later. Descriptions of the bombings 
attempted to convey to the public the destruction the bombs had caused: in the immediate 
aftermath, “women wandered around screaming as bodies, some of them horribly mutilated, 
littered the streets in pools of blood.”51 One bystander told The Guardian what she had seen: 
“There were limbs and bits of clothing scattered around the street, and things hanging on 
telephone wires.”52 33 people died, including a pregnant woman, and scores more were seriously 
injured. A bus strike had meant that more people were in the vicinity of the bombs, walking to 
train stations, and the fact that they exploded at this time in the early evening meant that the 
human cost was extreme. That this kind of devastation had occurred in the Republic was of great 
concern as many believed it indicated that an escalation of violence was to occur south of the 
border. 
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Certain responses to the bombings by loyalists in its immediate aftermath illuminate upon 
their gratification that actions were being taken in the Republic. Unionist politician John Taylor 
reported that despite his condemnation there was a “great deal of satisfaction amongst his 
constituents”, who believed that “the South” necessarily supported a nationalist or republican 
agenda and thus deserved to experience violence on par with that which was happening in the 
North; a UDA spokesman claimed to be “very happy” at the event and said of his organisation 
that “we are laughing at them.”53 The callousness apparent in these sentiments demonstrates the 
level of normality that violence had reached in the North, enough for people to feel vindicated – 
instead of shocked or disturbed – by such destruction and loss of life. It also shows a divide 
between the ways in which North and South perceived violence; for Northern Ireland this kind of 
destruction had become embedded in daily ritual, while few attacks had taken place in the 
Republic prior to this – especially in Dublin, which was a considerable distance from the border.  
Allegations of collusion between loyalists and the security services abounded, not least 
because it was widely believed that the UVF did not have the capacity to carry out such a large 
attack. Despite the size of this atrocity, relatively little was done in an attempt to locate or 
prosecute its perpetrators. The Gardai investigation into the bombings was wound down without 
any resolution after three months, an incredibly brief period of time for an event of this 
magnitude. Investigation into why this was so found evidence that certain pieces of important 
information were not followed up by the police and vital documentation had been lost. These 
included the annual files on the UDA and UVF for 1974 and 1975, which would have contained 
a great deal of important information on not only these bombings but a variety of different 
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events, and the security file on the Dublin bombings.
54
 The Barron report into the attacks 
concluded that, while no specific allegations of collusion could be established, the level of 
overall cooperation between security forces and loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland meant 
that some of those responsible may have been known to the police but were able to act with 
impunity. In fact, Barron concluded that it was “hard to accept the proposition” that security 
forces, both British and Irish, would have been completely surprised that the bombings took 
place, and that at least one British Army Senior Information Officer had expressed concerns 
about the impartiality of certain sections of the Army.
55 
 
The role of religious personnel such as, most importantly, the Reverend Ian Paisley, played no 
small part in propelling sectarian hatred and division. That these leaders preached such dogmatic 
and superstitious ideologies meant that paramilitary and other vigilante groups could justify 
themselves using the rhetoric of prominent religious and political figures. Paisley’s background 
was in conservative Presbyterianism, encouraged by his connections to American evangelical 
preachers. In 1951, after a directive from the Down Presbytery denying permission for Paisley to 
conduct a mission in one of their church halls, several members of the church congregated 
elsewhere and began to style themselves as belonging to  the new “Free Presbyterian Church of 
Ulster”.56 Paisley was to head this new church, which continues to describe itself as 
fundamentalist, separatist and anti-liberal.
57
 For the Free Presbyterians, “the Roman Catholic 
Church is quietly supportive of ‘physical force’ republicanism” despite vehement denials of this 
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by the Irish Catholic church, and Catholicism in general was viewed “as both false religion and 
the source of a wide range of social vices.”58 This meant that they saw all adherents to the 
Church as both adherents to republican violence and spiritually heretic – a dangerous 
generalisation to make in a community that already held deep-seated prejudice against Catholics. 
Bruce, using a range of biographical and census information, describes the Free Presbyterian 
Church’s first members as “not cosmopolitan; they were not university-educated mobile 
professionals who were exposed to a diverse range of social and cultural influences and whose 
working lives brought them into frequent contact with people from diverse backgrounds.”59 The 
danger in this was that they were particularly susceptible to Paisley’s fundamentalist preaching, 
more often than not blatantly sectarian in nature and which often explicitly encouraged violence 
or dissent against the Catholic population. It was also from this class of people that loyalist 
paramilitaries sourced the majority of their recruits. 
Paisley increasingly turned his attention towards the Civil Rights campaign, encouraging 
Protestant militancy against NICRA. This included preventing and provoking marches and 
protests, which often lead to violent confrontation. A devastating example of this, and one that 
was to provide a great deal of criticism against Protestant extremism, was the Burntollet Bridge 
incident in January 1969 which saw a 300-strong crowd of unionist counterdemonstrators attack 
a civil rights march on its way to Londonderry. The day before, Paisley had arranged a prayer 
meeting in the city’s Guildhall in an action that was clearly intended to inflame tensions. The 
Cameron report described the climate in the city and summarised the considered, conniving 
nature of Paisley’s character: 
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“The presence of Dr. Paisley and Major Bunting in Londonderry on the preceding evening 
was no accidental coincidence but deliberate, and in the mind of any intelligent person – 
and of Dr. Paisley’s intelligence, experience and capacity there is no doubt – such a 
meeting as he called on such an occasion would in all probability provoke sectarian 
reaction with consequent risk of riot.”60 
 
Rioting did occur, in which none of the People’s Democracy marchers were involved, and it was 
established that NICRA members assisted police in their efforts to calm the situation in 
Londonderry.
61
 Tensions were therefore necessarily high before the next day’s incident at 
Burntollet Bridge, described by Bernadette Devlin as a “curtain of bricks and boulders and 
bottles” being hailed on protesters by loyalist “Paisleyites” while the RUC did not do anything to 
stop the attack.
62
 No arrests of loyalists were made and this was indeed a marked example of 
police bias that had a great impact on the community at the very beginning of the Civil Rights 
campaign. Scores were injured by the violent counterdemonstrators despite the police being 
present. The paradox of Paisleyism was that, while denouncing the Civil Rights movement so 
strongly for creating public disturbance, the loyalist responses encouraged by Paisley were 
equally – if not more – damaging to social relations than were the initial protesters.63 
For Ulster Protestants, being linked to Protestantism after partition became necessary to 
ensure that their identity was more cohesive. “To make sense of their opposition to the Home 
Rule movement, and of the crisis from which Ulster was just emerging, they had to retain at least 
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a nominal attachment to Protestantism.”64 This is also a reason for why, despite denominational 
differences within the faith – most notably in Northern Ireland Presbyterianism and Anglicanism 
(Church of Ireland) – the Protestant community was viewed as a single entity with an easily 
identifiable opposing community. This solidarity despite factional differences was an anomaly in 
British history, as religious conflict in England, Scotland and Wales had long been about 
Protestant dissenting groups; at many points in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 Centuries new Protestant 
denominations had threatened to undermine the hegemony of the Church of England in ways that 
the Catholic Church had not. This was the opposite in Northern Ireland. As such, Protestant 
identity in Northern Ireland has been most pointedly defined by what it is not – specifically not 
Catholic, and to an extent not Irish – instead of producing a clear image of what exactly it is.65  
 
Mainstream unionism and loyalism continue to be unwavering in their convictions that conflict 
in Northern Ireland is the fault of republicans and that their claim to the region is supreme, 
making modern desires for reconciliation very difficult. “History, at several social levels, is 
synchronically organised in Northern Ireland, and the effect is to freeze the historical process, 
making it almost impossible for individuals and groups to enter into any kind of change.”66 This 
remains especially true in unionist circles, whose politics is notoriously resistant to progressive 
development. To Protestant communities the importance of historical events – such as the Battle 
of the Boyne in 1690 or the Battle of the Somme in WWI – is such that modern Protestant 
identity remains built on events that occurred in a radically different time; it is difficult to agree 
that social values and normalities remain unchanged since 1916, let alone 1690. In today’s 
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Northern Ireland this “freeze” is amplified by the memory of events of the Troubles, which serve 
as modern examples of communal difference and dissent. It is also clear that loyalists’ vision of a 
British state that was to accurately represent the principles and traditions of the Union would 
have been – and continues to be – an impossibility; indeed this ideal can be established as being 
as unrealistic as republican desires for a united Ireland. 
Part of the problem is that there exists a general will to vote foremost with one’s communal 
identity, i.e. to give democratic support along Protestant/unionist and Catholic/nationalist lines 
instead of to follow political ideologies. Regardless of the fact that the conflict has officially 
ended, “ethnicity is the primary ascriptive indicator of political choice in Northern Ireland.”67 
This complicates the electoral process in Northern Ireland, because it indicates a lasting 
preference to vote using sectarian reasoning and this skews how state ideology 
is created. Unionism will remain conservative because it is preferential towards an outdated and 
virtually non-existed idea of the British Union, with all its archaic connotations; nationalism will 
be able to support the working class more openly because left-wing political ideology has 
generally been their domain. There exists only one ideologically left-wing unionist party, the 
Progressive Unionist Party, which has strong and publicly maintained links with the UVF and 
the Red Hand Commando. The PUP reflects an ideology that is perhaps supported more widely 
in reality than is reflected by its electoral success; its explicit support for the loyalist working 
classes should theoretically be attractive to more people but its paramilitary connections mean 
that the party cannot garner a great deal of popular support. It is possible to understand these 
connections as being similar to those between the IRA and Sinn Féin, although the depth of this 
connection has not typically been as much of an issue for voters. Interestingly, the PUP 
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itself makes clear that it believes conservatism “runs contrary to” a significant part of the 
unionist and loyalist communities, which is an admission that mainstream unionist parties appear 
to wholly deny.
68
 This is an issue that remains key in modern Northern Irish politics and did 
hinder the peace process of the late 1990s, as unionism’s lack of adaptability to modern desires 
for conflict resolution means that efforts at cross-community reconciliation are necessarily 
treated with suspicion. 
The PUP’s assertion that “to condemn paramilitaries is simple” is, in fact, a sophisticated 
and important sentiment that the mainstream parties tend to negate, which does, as the party 
suggests, prevent them from engaging with all sections of society.
69
 They also, far apart from any 
other unionist grouping, advocate for “conciliatory politics” and recognise that the responsibility 
for past events is a shared one; this is a radical notion, especially to highly conservative 
mainstream parties.
70
 The DUP, the party currently with the most seats in the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, is certainly far from accepting any sort of mutual accountability or cooperation with 
republicans, to the detriment of communal integration. It is highly unlikely, however, that this 
will change as the DUP has consistently publicised their intention to resist “the rewriting of the 
past or the persecution of the security forces” – a statement that appears to wholly negate 
republican perspectives on the province’s history.71 Echoes of the aforementioned ‘siege 
mentality’ are existent in the DUP’s Manifesto, which contains much information on their desire 
to extend Northern Ireland’s military capability and continual pledges to negate the political 
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wishes of Sinn Féin or republican groups.
72
 The continuing sectarianism evident in Northern 
Ireland politics presents great difficulty for reconciliation projects, and ignores the socio-
historical reality that all groups – including unionists and loyalists – are responsible for the 
violence that occurred. 
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Chapter Three 
State Security Forces: the RUC and the British Army 
 
State involvement in the Northern Ireland conflict requires evaluation on a number of different 
levels. Firstly, it must be understood why the Army was deployed in the province to begin with, 
and how it interacted with the existing police force. Also necessary to study is the ways in which 
communal acceptance and/or dismissal of the Army was shaped against its particular 
relationships with the Catholic and Protestant communities. This includes particular events, such 
as internment and Bloody Sunday, which were highly damaging to communal relations, as well 
as the differing ways in which the Army dealt with these communities and the uneven level of 
focus it gave to republican paramilitary groups over loyalists. Particularly important here is the 
connection between state forces and violent loyalism, a topic that has been investigated 
extensively in the post-Good Friday Agreement period. Evidence of widespread collusion – 
something that had always been alleged but not confirmed – has, in recent years, been firmly 
established. This demonstrates on a general level that the Protestant and Catholic communities 
were treated very differently by the RUC and Army, and that this greatly impacted how 
paramilitary actors responded. 
 
As discussed before, atrocities committed by the RUC made the Catholic community highly 
suspicious of their impartiality or will to protect all sectors of society. Its demographics certainly 
persuaded people as such; it was an overwhelmingly Protestant force and this inherent bias 
prevented many Catholics from becoming involved. In 1969 a mere 11 per cent of the RUC was 
Catholic; by 1993 this had dropped to 7 per cent, indicating that recruitment amongst this 
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community diminished throughout the conflict.
1
 The more militaristic Ulster Special 
Constabulary, or ‘B-Specials’ (a group that was responsible for many civilian deaths in the 1920s 
and which had historically had an antagonistic relationship with the Catholic community) was 
comprised entirely of Protestants.
2
 The histories of these groups, coupled with their 
contemporary actions, created an inherently hostile environment in which communal retaliation 
was far from unprecedented.  
In August 1969, after a prolonged period of rioting in Londonderry and the especially 
ferocious Battle of the Bogside – a three-day riot in which police were physically forced out of 
the city’s Bogside area – the decision was made to deploy the British Army in Northern Ireland 
initially as a “limited operation” to restore peace.3 This was intended as a means to replace the 
RUC, which was becoming increasingly strained by the longevity of the rioting and was 
completely alienated from large portions of the population. At first, the Catholic community 
viewed this change as a victory; it was evident that their resistance was enough to overcome the 
local police force. It also appeared to be an opportunity for policing that would be impartial 
towards both communities, as the Army had no history in Northern Ireland before this point. 
This did not last for very long, however. Neither the Protestant nor Catholic communities 
believed that the Army was there to simply keep the peace; both were suspicious that it had been 
brought in to support the other side. As further marches and politico-religious demonstrations 
were prevented by the Army, and riot situations began once more to occur, cyclical violence then 
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started to cast the soldiers as antagonistic figures against the community.
4
 The Army’s actions 
for the most part were determined by the position they were ordered to be in, the directive of 
which often came from politicians who were not involved on the ground. Evidently this 
presented difficulties for accurate or impartial policing regardless of religious or social 
affiliation. Belfast presented a particular problem, as the “rigid sectarian geography of the city 
with its myriad little side streets wandering haphazardly through sensitive Catholic and 
Protestant areas” was completely unknown to the vast majority of soldiers – who, prior to 
deployment, had most likely never set foot anywhere in Northern Ireland.
5
 Without adequate 
direction it was exceedingly problematic for the Army to navigate its relationship with both 
Catholic and Protestant areas. In this climate of increasing resentment between security forces 
and local communities, events such as the August 1971 internment raids and Bloody Sunday in 
January 1972 were pivotal in placing public opinion against the Army and its involvement in 
Northern Ireland altogether. 
  
In an attempt to curb the escalation of paramilitary organisations, the government decided to 
implement a policy of internment without trial and launch an arrest operation against people they 
believed to be active in militant groups. The idea was to weaken these illegal groups, especially 
the IRA, before they could properly recruit, aim and train volunteers. The OIRA/PIRA split had 
proven that a majority in the organisation wished to develop a more militaristic approach than 
they had in previous years, so the threat of an armed insurgency was therefore heightened. 
Internment had been a decisive factor in the defeat of the IRA in the 1950s and as such was 
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reasonably thought to be an effective tactic, but what was not taken into account were the 
sweeping social changes that had occurred – driven by the Civil Rights movement – and the fact 
that the RUC had not yet collected a great deal of intelligence on dissident groups. Thus the first 
major issue Operation Demetrius faced was informational – the Army was given incomplete and 
outdated lists of potential internees, many of whom were IRA members in the 1940s and 1950s 
but were either no longer involved in the organisation, elderly, or in some cases who had already 
died. It also appeared wholly focused towards the republican community: the only “non-
Catholic” arrested was also a member of NICRA, and thus affiliated with nationalist politics.6 
While subduing the IRA was certainly the primary objective, loyalist paramilitaries had also 
been active and posed as much threat to disturbing social order as did their republican 
counterparts. The operation had also been opposed by the General Officer in Command of the 
British Army, Sir Harry Tuzo, who warned British Prime Minister Edward Heath and Northern 
Ireland Prime Minister Brian Faulkner that there was a high chance internment would have “a 
harmful effect on the security situation.”7 After allegations that suspects had been mistreated 
during interrogation Tuzo also headed calls demanding an inquiry into internment practices, 
demonstrating that there existed a large gap between the military directives of politicians in 
Britain and the Army in Northern Ireland and that this lack of understanding did much to 
exacerbate tension.
8
 
The accusations that members of the RUC, supervised by the Army, had used techniques 
that constituted torture on internees during interrogation propelled another increase in IRA 
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membership. The so-called “five techniques” – hooding, sleep and food deprivation, ceaseless 
playing of white noise and forced standing in stress positions – were further proof of state 
security forces’ willingness to use brutality and “galvanised” the nationalist community against 
them.
9
 These allegations were subject to an investigation by the European Commission of 
Human Rights, which found that the five techniques did indeed constitute torture. When taken 
further to the European Court of Human Rights, however, this body did not agree that the 
intensity of the RUC’s interrogation cohered with their definition of torture – the internees 
concerned “did not occasion suffering of the particular intensity or cruelty implied by the word 
torture.”10 This was not a unanimous view amongst the ECHR judges, five of whom presented 
separate opinions that agreed with the Commission findings. Unsurprisingly, this ruling caused 
great controversy in Ireland and internationally; there was a widespread view that the finding 
was inadequate. Documents released in 2014 prove that these “methods of torture” had been 
explicitly sanctioned by government ministers, including the then Secretary of State for Defence 
Lord Carrington.
11
 This has provoked recent calls for further litigation against Britain in order to 
establish that internees had been knowingly tortured and for a revision of the finding that the 
methods did not constitute torture.
12
 The ruling also provided a grave precedent for allowing 
interrogation techniques in other modern conflicts, especially by the USA and Britain in Iraq.
13
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Instead of being a productive mechanism for curbing violence, the internment raids of 
August 1971 directly provoked an unprecedented acceleration in paramilitary activity. Up until 
August, 32 people had been killed in Troubles-related incidents; the remainder of the year saw 
148 deaths, with 24 of these occurring in the week after the first raid on August 9
th
.
14
 The vast 
majority of civilians killed during this period were done so by Army fire, which had the effect of 
compounding violence and cementing the Army’s status as an enemy especially to the Catholic 
community. In fact, nine Catholic civilians were killed by the army on the 9
th
 August alone, as 
were three more the next day. Particularly disturbing was the example of Father Hugh Mullan 
and civilian Frank Quinn, who were killed by Army fire as they attempted to reach a wounded 
civilian; Mullan had been waving a white cloth to signify his intention but was shot regardless, 
as was Quinn when he tried to reach both the original casualty and the priest.
15
 The Catholic 
community believed these deaths in particular to have been intentional, and whether or not this 
was correct they had a particularly damaging effect. Throughout 1971 the Army killed a total of 
35 Catholic civilians compared to 3 Protestant civilians, many of whom died in disputed 
circumstances, to the total detriment of the security forces’ relationship with the Catholic 
community.
16
  
 
A defining moment that was to further damage the Army’s relationship with the Catholic 
community was Bloody Sunday. On the 30
th
 January 1972, during what was supposed to be a 
peaceful anti-internment march organised by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, 
soldiers shot dead 13 civilians and injured 15 more, one of whom later died from his injuries – 
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none of whom were “posing any threat of causing death or serious injury,” the only acceptable 
circumstance in which a soldier could fire weaponry.
17
 In the immediate aftermath of the event, 
the Provisional IRA’s membership ballooned and political negotiation became impossible. An 
inquiry, the Widgery Tribunal, delivered its findings in April 1972 that no soldiers were culpable 
for the deaths on Bloody Sunday; his admission that the firing “bordered on the reckless” was 
widely criticised as offensively euphemistic.
18
 Accusations that the tribunal was a ‘whitewash’ 
continued until a new inquiry was agreed to in 1998. The findings of the Saville Inquiry in 2010 
overturned the Widgery Tribunal’s findings and confirmed that, in the event, soldiers had fired 
first and at unarmed civilians.  
The NICRA march took place during a ban on all parades and marches, put into place by 
Northern Irish Prime Minister Brian Faulkner in reaction to knowledge that a large-scale and 
potentially provocative protest had been planned. Previous similar bans had rarely made much of 
an impact – they were often defied with little consequence – but this meant that a higher level of 
security, with the ability to close off proposed routes or stop marchers from accessing various 
locations, was to be expected. Indeed, the organisers of the march had intended to march to 
Londonderry’s Guildhall to hear prominent anti-internment and Civil Rights speakers, but this 
plan was stopped by security forces who indicated that they would not be allowed past the city 
walls. Much of this decision was based on the fear that unionist counter-demonstrators within the 
city would incite violence, not because of concerns that the rally itself would become violent.
19
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Instead the route would remain in the Bogside area of the city and speakers would be heard at 
Free Derry Corner, against the iconic gable wall that had been painted with the words “You are 
now entering Free Derry” to symbolise the community’s political affiliation. This meant that the 
entire parade was confined to highly republican ‘no-go’ areas, where soldiers typically did not 
encroach and where it was established that paramilitaries operated freely. This immediately 
created a situation in which suspicion and tension were heightened, and where the Army 
necessarily felt under threat. There was also intense pressure for any security forces involved to 
act with restraint; a week earlier, an anti-internment protest at Magilligan strand had turned 
particularly violent on the part of the Army, with extensive allegations of brutality confirmed by 
broadcasted film of the event. The Army itself admitted that its actions had been “unacceptably 
violent” and that officers themselves had been disturbed by certain of their colleagues’ 
behaviour.
20
 Because of this, the organisers were adamant that this larger march should be 
peaceful and obtained assurance from both the Official and Provisional IRA that no paramilitary 
action would take place on the day, an assurance that was noted by both the RUC and the 
Army.
21
 The latter, however, decided that soldiers would be sent in to perform a ‘scoop-up’ 
operation against possible rioters and the 1
st
 Battalion Parachute Regiment – the regiment that 
was responsible for the violence against demonstrators at Magilligan strand – was chosen to be 
deployed. This battalion was not stationed in Londonderry, had never before performed duties 
there and furthermore had a “reputation for using excessive physical violence, which thus ran the 
risk of exacerbating the tensions between the Army and nationalists in Londonderry.”22 The 
Saville Report notes that there was “uneasiness” by some members of the security forces at the 
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decision to send in 1
st
 Para but that this concern was not taken into account when the final 
directive was given.
23
  
As the march continued, it became more riotous; the vast majority of the over 10,000 
protesters followed the new route to Free Derry Corner, but fringe elements confronted the Army 
at established barriers blocking the parade from the city. Rioting here was met by water cannons 
and rubber bullets, which were fairly effective in dispersing the crowds, but after this rioting had 
ceased 1
st
 Para requested permission to move past the barricades and conduct an arrest operation 
as had been proposed. This was only supposed to be approved once it was certain that there was 
distinct separation between rioters and peaceful marchers, but was instead permitted prematurely 
and through a larger number of Army barriers than was intended. The use of vehicles was also 
unprecedented, as usual scoop-up operations were conducted on foot.
24
 Also contrary to orders 
that explicitly prohibited a “running battle down Rossville Street” the soldiers did just that, 
where the majority of people in the area were civilians either returning home from the march or 
continuing towards Free Derry Corner. After the first vehicles arrived at Rossville Street, “only 
some ten minutes elapsed” before the last casualty was shot.25 Soldiers had fired over 100 
rounds, 13 civilians were killed and a further 14 were wounded, one of whom later died from 
their injuries.
26
 Only one casualty, Gerald Donaghey, was found to have had any sort of 
weaponry on his person at the time; four nail bombs were found in his pockets upon his death. 
He had, however, been fatally wounded by a bullet that had already shot and killed Gerard 
McKinney, and both were shot in positions that indicated that, at the time, they had been running 
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for safety.
27
 This was a particularly disturbing feature of many of the deaths: both witnesses and 
forensic evidence established the fact that civilians in certain cases were running or crawling 
from soldiers, some with their hands in the air.
28
 Ultimately the Saville Report’s description – 
“the casualties were either the intended targets of the soldiers or the result of shots fired 
indiscriminately at people” – explains the gravity of the event in impartial terms.29 
For a community as close-knit and politically charged as that of the Bogside the loss of life 
was devastating. The IRA’s membership skyrocketed: later, people described that “there were 
queues to join,” that they “would never have become involved in the IRA” if Bloody Sunday had 
not happened and, as Gerry Adams asserted, “Money, guns and recruits flooded into the IRA.”30 
The Widgery Tribunal into the events of the day similarly angered the community, as its findings 
were overwhelmingly supportive of the Army and failed to exonerate the victims of any guilt. 
The report had serious inconsistencies, most remarkably that although there was no evidence to 
suggest that any of the fatalities had handled weaponry, it was stated that soldiers had been fired 
on initially; for the families of the victims this “destroyed [their] loved ones’ good names”.31 
Widgery, while accepting that the only evidence given to him of civilians with weaponry came 
from soldiers’ testimonies – in other words, there was no civilian, visual or recovered evidence 
of this and no soldiers were wounded – still did not find the soldiers culpable. That an 
independent public inquiry did not take place until 1998, 26 years after the event, meant that for 
the duration of the conflict the Catholic community, especially in Londonderry, did not feel as if 
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they had been legitimately vindicated. To Londonderry Bishop Edward Daly, who was present 
during the event and had given the last rites to a number of casualties, this initial inquiry into 
Bloody Sunday was singularly disturbing because “people afterwards, at the highest level of 
British justice, justified it.”32 Evidence also suggested that Widgery’s findings were manipulated 
by a memo between the then-Prime Minister of Britain, Edward Heath, and Lord Widgery, 
where Heath reminded him that Britain was “fighting not only a military war but a propaganda 
war” – a suggestive statement to express to the head of a supposedly independent inquiry.33 
More than any other single event, Bloody Sunday exemplifies the theory that cultural 
formation is shaped by the crystallisation of a collective experience “whose meaning, when 
touched upon, may suddenly become accessible again across millennia.”34 The psychological 
impact of a community, hitherto accepting of the arrival of the British army as an impartial and 
potentially protective force against what was perceived as an existent state threat, losing civilian 
members through the actions of that force was irreconcilable. The community felt that they had 
been treated as an active enemy; that necessarily meant that the Army was in turn viewed as an 
enemy of that community. It also served to prove to wider Catholic society in Northern Ireland 
that they were indeed considered inferior to state forces as the Protestant community had never 
been. As nationalist MP Bernadette Devlin McAliskey described later, “On that day we knew 
real fear for the first time… [people] crawled away like dogs in fear of their masters.”35 
Collective memory in Londonderry was therefore set firmly against British involvement and 
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physical markers of remembrance served to reinstate this opposition long after the event had 
taken place. The iconic “You are now entering Free Derry” inscription on a gable wall – what 
became Free Derry Corner, where the NICRA march had intended to end at – remains a 
prominent and important feature of the Bogside, as well as commemorative murals and 
memorials that detail the events of the day and those who lost their lives. Bloody Sunday is 
constantly remembered, which necessarily means that the Army, throughout the conflict and into 
the future, remains a distinctly threatening and illegitimate organisation to the local community. 
 
Evidence of collusion between state actors and loyalist paramilitary groups certainly did not 
assist in easing tensions in the region or perpetuating a sense of trust between the state and the 
Catholic community. In particular members of the UDR were implicated in many instances of 
collaboration with Protestant extremism. A military intelligence report complied in 1973 but 
released under the Public Record Office’s ‘thirty year rule’ entitled Subversion in the UDR 
admits a level of cooperation between members of the UDR and the UDA that appears to be 
objectively untenable, but that did not in effect change recruitment processes of the organisation 
or its internal disciplinary policy. McGovern, who describes this collusion as “rampant,” also 
details how it was not incompatible with existing British counterinsurgency practice; in fact, the 
use or sanctioning of non-state military actors occurred in many other colonial conflicts in 
Britain’s history.36 Counterinsurgency strategy had always contained a level of subversion, in 
that it necessitated both demonstrating “political will to defeat the insurgent” (in this case the 
IRA, as loyalists were considered pro-state terrorists) while displaying the minimum force 
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possible so as to not alienate the local community.
37
 Cooperating with pro-state paramilitary 
groups enabled legitimate forces to maintain the illusion of ‘minimum force’ while continuing to 
undermine the cause of the insurgent. This level of collusion is reflected in the report’s findings, 
which suggested that “a significant proportion (perhaps five per cent – in some areas as high as 
15 per cent) of UDR soldiers will also be members of the UDA, Vanguard service corps, Orange 
Volunteers or UVF.”38 The arms losses the report details are also startling, especially when 
considering that it acknowledges the probability that these weapons were stolen and sourced for 
loyalist paramilitaries. In 1972 and half of 1973, while regular Army weapons losses numbered a 
total of 18, the UDR had lost 218 in the same time period.
39
 Another of the report’s findings was 
that, due to the fact that the UDR was a locally-sourced regiment, it was not difficult to assume 
that many soldiers’ first loyalty would lie with “the concept of ‘Ulster’” instead of the British 
government.
40
 In fact, its concluding statement reflects this and acknowledges a reluctance to 
remedy this belief: “Any effort to remove men who in foreseeable political circumstances might 
well operate against the interests of the UDR could well result in a very small regiment 
indeed.”41 Not only does this infer a general lack of will to change recruitment practice, but also 
suggests that the majority of the company – regardless of explicit involvement in paramilitary 
groups – would probably act in their own interests before those of their political and military 
leaders. As the UDR was overwhelmingly Protestant in its makeup this necessarily meant that an 
anti-Catholic bias existed and that this would presumably affect the ways in which the regiment 
operated. That this report was collated in 1973, during a period of extensive, unprecedented 
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violence, indicates that authorities both knew of collusion between state forces and Protestant 
extremist groups and did not desire to properly stop this practice, despite material losses and the 
potential for severe damage to community relations.   
 
The death of Catholic civilian Loughlin Maginn in August 1989 caused great controversy when 
it was revealed that not only were the perpetrators members of both the UDA and UDR but also 
that the victim had been threatened by the security forces before his death. Maginn “had told his 
wife the police had threatened him with loyalist assassination” and members of the UFF claimed 
that they had received British security intelligence documents that listed him as a member of the 
IRA, although his family vehemently denied this and he was not remembered on any republican 
roll of honour.
42
 This case in particular proved that a level of collusion did exist between the 
organisations, enough for intelligence to be passed onto the UDA, and that it was clear that this 
information would be used to facilitate killings. Following this incident an inquiry was called to 
establish whether or not there were direct and consistent links between the UDR and loyalist 
paramilitary groups. In all, three inquiries were carried out by Lord Stevens, ending in 2003, and 
suggested that a great deal of cooperation did exist. During Stevens’s investigation allegations 
were also made against the Army and the RUC’s Special Branch for “obstruction and 
harassment” toward Stevens’ teams throughout each of the three inquiries, the majority of which 
were substantiated by further investigation by the teams.
43
 This included the discovery of 
documents which, when initially requested, were claimed by security forces to not exist; the 
leaking of arrest operation information, leading to the escape of the intended target, UDA 
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intelligence chief and informant to the RUC Brian Nelson; and finally – and most damningly – 
the destruction of Stevens’ “Incident room,” which he believed was a “deliberate act of arson.”44 
According to the Financial Times 108 out of 120 loyalist paramilitaries interviewed by Stevens 
were “agents of the state,” an alarming number considering that they were able to act without 
impunity until the completion of an independent inquiry.
45
 In all, 144 arrests were made by 
recommendation of the Stevens inquiry.
46
 It is clear from this that a great deal of illegal activity 
was permitted and at times encouraged by state-sanctioned security forces, mainly against 
republicans or, at times, Catholic civilians, that certainly breached existing protocol (however 
insubstantial this was found to be).  
A 2012 report into the murder of solicitor Patrick Finucane produced similar results and 
established a level of collusion between loyalists and state agencies. The De Silva report 
established that, on one level, security forces’ lack of action when confronted with intelligence 
given to them by their agents within paramilitary organisations represented an unacceptable level 
of tolerance for illegal actions undertaken by loyalists. By not acting upon information that 
directly presented threats to peoples’ lives, the Army and RUC had contravened basic tenets of 
international human rights law. As the British Government did not have specific human rights 
legislation until the Human Rights Act 1998, basic rights were enshrined under the European 
Convention on Human Rights which Britain had ratified in 1951. This expressly stated that “the 
most fundamental of all human rights is the individual’s right to life,” which requires states to 
protect those who are known to be vulnerable and to take preventative measures – such as 
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appropriate legal provisions and law enforcement – to ensure that this right is defended.47 A part 
of this problem was that, outside the scope of these very general international statutes, there were 
no codified rules for dealing with agents in Northern Ireland that were potentially required to 
commit paramilitary crimes. Necessarily, some level of illegal activity had to be permitted for an 
agent to believably infiltrate a group; this was supposedly never permitted to infringe on an 
individual’s right to life. However, there was no specific legislation or law enforcement protocol 
that dealt with the tension between these two requirements. McGovern views this lack of legal 
framework as something that institutional bodies were conscious of, and which allowed a level 
of plausible deniability that would otherwise not be possible under more stringent or explicit 
policy. This analysis of agent-handling is backed by certain of the findings of Stevens and De 
Silva who both uncovered that there was a consistent and established culture of ignoring certain 
pieces of information pertaining to potential loyalist crimes.  
State collusion with loyalist paramilitaries had long been suspected in nationalist 
communities, although official inquiries did not exist until the commencement of Stevens’s first 
investigation in 1989. The difficulty and level of obstruction Stevens faced immediately 
illuminated upon the likelihood that systematic cooperation existed and was continuing to be 
protected by state forces. De Silva’s later report also stressed that the RUC was far more willing 
to act on information that pertained to republican activity rather than threats made by loyalists. 
Between 1987 and 1989, the RUC’s ‘Threat Book’ recorded “730 instances of republican 
paramilitary threats” compared to 36 threats made by loyalists, although the responsibility for 
murders was far more evenly spread: republicans were responsible for 55% and loyalists for 
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45%.
48
 In general it appeared that RUC and Special Branch Army officers were incredibly 
tolerant of loyalist paramilitaries’ targeting of republican figures or suspects as they were 
perceived as common threats – the elimination of which, if undertaken by paramilitaries, did not 
leave security forces explicitly responsible.
49
  
 
The actions of security forces necessarily will shape community relations, especially in the 
Northern Irish case. Counterinsurgency practice that sought to capture the political and social 
will of the population the Army was working with, and in this case in particular the Catholic 
community, was not possible after displays of brutality. RUC actions against Civil Rights 
campaigners alienated an already hostile society; the introduction of internment in 1971 
compounded suspicions that state forces were solely and erroneously targeting the nationalist 
community and the events of Bloody Sunday cemented this fact for many people. The 
investigations undertaken by Stevens and De Silva, established after the deaths of civilians by 
loyalist paramilitaries, proved that there was an untenable degree of collusion between state 
actors and Protestant militants – findings that vindicated the Catholic community who had for 
many years been suspicious of this. That state-led forces cooperated with loyalist paramilitaries 
demonstrates, to a large degree, the complex nature of a conflict of which responsibility lies with 
a range of actors, not just Irish republicans. 
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Conclusion 
 
In a society so divided as Northern Ireland, identity formation for the separate communities is 
essential to preserve their distinct cultures – despite how this, to people unused to the country’s 
internal politics, may seem unproductive or resistant to modern development. There is a great 
importance for the Catholic and Protestant communities in perpetuating the folklore and 
mythology that aims to preserve their culture and values across generations. As sectarianism in 
Northern Ireland is perpetuated through the separateness of these two communities, public 
displays of overt support for republicanism or loyalism are regular and important fixtures in the 
province, each seeking to demonstrate the perceived superiority of one side over another. To 
have a clear ideological and cultural opposition is vital to social identity formation, and 
communal mythology seeks to establish this to an undeniable degree.
1
 Murals, songs and parades 
each serve as valuable resources for evaluating certain events’ importance in popular memory 
and the ways in which these are able to perpetuate division. Moreover, Protestant murals and 
imagery are often based on depictions of “blood sacrifice and/or Catholic deception,” to firmly 
cast the Catholic community as aggressive against a pacifist or sacrificial Protestant people.
2
 
In a situation such as this the importance of institutional or historical recognition is 
paramount, especially if a tentatively-built peace is to be retained. To do this it is necessary to 
uncover the realities of a situation far more complex than is discoverable through studying 
different actors in isolation. The interaction between republican and loyalist paramilitaries, state 
forces such as the Royal Ulster Constabulary or the British Army and local communities 
is incredibly intricate and cannot be ignored, however difficult it may be to then 
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quantify culpability. These actors’ historical interactions also have a large role in the ways in 
which modern violence was undertaken. It is clearly both more simple and more satisfying to 
assign blame or responsibility to a singular party – in this case, the IRA has typically played this 
role in mainstream media and in the United Kingdom’s historical narrative – but this practice 
ignores socio-political and historical realities. Northern Ireland’s reality is that it is not a nation 
in Renan’s sense but a region in which two opposing identity groups exist, both of whom have 
unwavering belief in the supremacy of their culture and claim to the land.  
Public inquiry and contemporary investigation into past events is evidently important to 
both communities in providing deeper recognition of past atrocities and commemorating the 
human losses of the conflict. A particularly salient example of this is the Saville Report into the 
events of Bloody Sunday, which was negotiated during peace negotiations; while a vital element 
towards for reconciliation to the Catholic community, many unionists believed it to be an unfair 
concession to republican demands. Its findings, however, which negated the original 1972 
Widgery Report, provided vindication and closure for a large section of the Catholic and 
nationalist communities across the province. Established evidence of collusion between state 
actors and paramilitary forces, most notably through the Stevens and De Silva investigations, 
have also become examples of institutionalised commemoration. To confirm a long-held 
suspicion that paramilitaries – particularly loyalist groups – received assistance in the form of 
information and munitions from the British armed forces vindicated many in the civilian 
community. They also established that vague legislature and general wilful ignorance implied 
that the British Government was aware and tolerant of this behaviour. By re-examining the 
political decision-making that occurred during the conflict, inquiries – particularly those of 
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Saville, Stevens and De Silva – are able to address historical grievances and hold institutional 
actors to account. 
Republican paramilitary activity, far from being the genesis of the conflict, was spurred by 
a perceived need to protect the Catholic community against violent Protestant militants and the 
actions of a historically sectarian police force. Loyalist counterdemonstrations against Civil 
Rights campaigners, the RUC’s periodic displays of brutality and the inter-community rioting of 
August 1969 compounded paramilitary operations. The later actions of IRA splinter groups, 
however – most notably the Omagh bombing in 1998 – cast the organisation as the conflict’s 
dominant antagonist in popular memory despite the historical reality. Protestant paramilitaries 
therefore typically receive less attention; groups like the UVF’s Shankill Butchers and atrocities 
such as the Dublin Monaghan Bombings are not usually discussed as Troubles case studies 
despite being incredibly damaging, both in terms of human cost and the psychological damage 
they did to broader society. The role of the RUC and the British Army throughout this time also 
requires analysis as their actions did much to deepen tensions between republicans, loyalists and 
the state.  
Memory in Northern Ireland exists on a fractured plane because society itself is necessarily 
oppositional. The actors, as has been established, are varied and contributed to the conflict for 
differing reasons; oftentimes these differences existed within the same organisation. It is 
unhelpful to cast a sole actor as the instigator of – and aggressor throughout – the conflict, even 
if this may simplify the country’s historical narrative. The Northern Ireland Troubles was a 
complex event in a region with an extensive history of revolt and sectarian dissent, and for 
violence to break out to the extent that it did was not necessarily inconceivable; the actions of 
republicans, loyalists and the state were often mutually reinforcing. Understanding its intricacies, 
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and accepting that all those involved are responsible for the continuation and escalation of 
violence, presents a far more nuanced analysis on a conflict whose political and social 
ramifications endure today.  
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